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This thesis is comprised of three essays relating to long term unemployment in Spain.
The first chapter is methodological analysis of the main dataset that is used through-
out the thesis. The second and third chapter provide two applications of the dataset
for the study of long term unemployment. The methodology in these chapters can
be easily adapted to study unemployment in other countries.
Chapter 1. On the use of administrative data for the study of unem-
ployment Social security administrative data are increasingly becoming available
in many countries. These are very attractive data as they have a long panel struc-
ture (large N, large T) and allow to measure many different variables with higher
precision. Because of their nature they can capture aspects that are usually hidden
due to design or timing of survey data. However, administrative data are not ready
to be used for labour market research, especially studies involving unemployment.
The main reason is that administrative data only capture those registered unem-
ployed, and in some cases only those receiving unemployment benefits. The gap
between total unemployment and registered unemployment is not constant neither
across workers characteristics nor time. In this paper I augment Spanish Social Secu-
rity administrative data by adding missing unemployment spells using information
from the institutional framework. I compare the resulting unemployment rate to
that of the Labour Force Survey, showing that both are comparable and thus the
administrative dataset is useful for labour market research. I also explore how the
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administrative data can be used to study some important aspects of the labour mar-
ket that the Labour Force survey can’t capture. Administrative data can also be
used to overcome some of the problems of the Labour Force survey such as changes
in the structure of the survey. This paper aims to provide a comprehensive guide on
how to adapt administrative datasets to make them useful for studying unemploy-
ment.
Chapter 2. Unemployment Duration Variance Decomposition à la
ABS: Evidence from Spain Existing studies of unemployment duration typi-
cally use self-reported information from labour force surveys. We revisit this ques-
tion using precise information on spells from administrative data. We follow the
recent method proposed by Alvarez, Borovickova and Shimer (2015) for estimating
the different components of the duration of unemployment using administrative data
and have applied it to Austria. In this paper we apply the same method (the ABS
method hereafter) to Spain using Spanish Social Security data. Administrative data
have many advantages compared to Labour Force Survey data, but we note that
there are some incompleteness that need to be enhanced in order to use the data
for unemployment analysis (e.g., unemployed workers that run out of unemployment
insurance have no labour market status in the data). The degree and nature of such
incompleteness is country-specific and are particularly important in Spain. Following
Chapter 1, we deal with these data issues in a systematic way by using information
from the Spanish LFS data as well as institutional information. We hope that our
approach will provide a useful way to apply the ABS method in other countries.
Our findings are: (i) the unemployment decomposition is quite similar in Austria
and Spain, specially when minimizing the effect of fixed-term contracts in Spain. (ii)
the constant component is the most important one; while (total) heterogeneity and
duration dependence are roughly comparable. (iii) also, we do not find big differ-
ences in the contribution of the different components along the business cycle.
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Chapter 3. Search Capital and Unemployment Duration I propose a
novel mechanism called search capital to explain long term unemployment patters
across different ages: workers who have been successful in finding jobs in the recent
past become more efficient at finding jobs in the present. Search ability increases
with search experience and depreciates with tenure if workers do not search often
enough. This leaves young (who have not gained enough search experience) and
older workers in a disadvantaged position, making them more likely to suffer long
term unemployment. I focus on the case of Spain, as its dual labour market structure
favours the identification of search capital. I provide empirical evidence that search
capital affects unemployment duration and wages at the individual level. Then I
propose a search model with search capital and calibrate it using Spanish adminis-
trative data. The addition of search capital helps the model match the dynamics of




Long Term Unemployment (unemployment of more than 12 months of duration,
LTU thereafter) is a very serious issue. It negative affects not only job market out-
comes in the future but also health and well-being of workers who suffer it. The last
recession has seen LTU rise in many countries but it has especially affected Southern
European countries. Spain is one of them, and it’s an interesting case in its own
because of the large reforms that have taken place in the last 30 years, changing
the structure of the labour market. In particular, the introduction of temporary
contracts and its widespread use made Spain an anomaly among European countries
with large labour market flows and highly protected employment. This increase in
flows out of unemployment contributed towards the fall of long-term unemployment
in the 1993-2007 period, from over 50% to below 20% in 2007. The financial crisis
and the European debt crisis quickly reversed these patterns, with long-term unem-
ployment reaching over 50% again in 2014. This increase was long-lived as well, as
of 2017 it is still over 40%. One new and worrying feature of this increase is that it
has disproportionally affected the young. Most explanations in the literature for the
rise and persistence of LTU during recessions are targeted towards older workers –
mainly loss of human capital and search incentives. In this thesis I turn to the data
to further examine this issue.
My first chapter is devoted to the data themselves. In particular, I focus on the
issues arising from using administrative datasets, which have complete working his-
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tories of a large sample of workers, for the study of unemployment. Researchers have
traditionally turned to Labour Force Surveys, as it contains self-reported information
on whether workers are unemployed, but they have their shortcomings. In particu-
lar, attrition (non-response of individuals after the first interview) is an important
issue for measuring unemployment in the Spanish Labour Force Survey. I show how
the administrative and survey datasets are comparable and thus how administrative
datasets can be used for the study of unemployment. This is crucial for long-term
unemployment, since the information on duration of the administrative data is much
more precise. Chapters 2 and 3 use these data to explore two questions that relate
to long-term unemployment: how much changes in composition (heterogeneity) and
duration dependence contribute towards the explaining the variance of the duration
of unemployment, and a particular channel though which previous work experiences
can affect unemployment duration.
The second chapter (co-authored with my supervisor Maia Güell) uses the ex-
panded administrative dataset to decompose the variance of unemployment dura-
tion into three fundamental components: worker heterogeneity (observed and un-
observed), duration dependence and constant hazard component. Worker hetero-
geneity refers to all individual characteristics that make workers experience different
unemployment durations from others, like ability, age or gender. Duration depen-
dence relates to the empirical observation that the odds of leaving unemployment are
decreasing as individual’s time in unemployment increases. It can be due to discrim-
ination on the side of the employer, demoralising or other driving forces. Finally,
the constant hazard component is the underlying probability that any unemployed
worker, independent of individual characteristics or time in unemployment, finds a
job. We interpret this as the overall (or macroeconomic) state of the labour market
that affects all workers. We carry out the decomposition of unemployment variance
in these three components following the methodology in Alvarez, Borovickova and
Shimer (2015). This methodology requires a large sample with only two completed
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spells of unemployment per individual. The administrative data from Chapter 1 is
well suited for this. We find the constant hazard component to be the largest, ex-
plaining 60% of the total variation, with the rest split evenly between heterogeneity
and duration dependence. We also find that the weight of the three components for
Spain is remarkably similar to the one Alvarez, Borovickova and Shimer found for
Austria, a European country with very different unemployment dynamics. More-
over, using the last recession we find that the weights of the different components
do not substantially change over the business cycle. This result is very important
for the study of long-term unemployment, as duration dependence and heterogeneity
have both been proposed to explain its nature. Our results suggest that most of its
volatility is due to aggregate fluctuations in the job finding rate, and that Spain has
no fundamental difference in these components to Austria.
The third chapter seeks to explain part of the unobserved heterogeneity driv-
ing the increase of long-term unemployment during recessions. I investigate how
past employment experiences can affect unemployment outcomes in the present. I
propose a new channel, search capital, which comprises all the skills that help with
job search and that are learnt through participating in the labour market as a job
seeker. Thus workers who are more up-to-date with the job market are better at
finding jobs than first job seekers or those who have enter unemployment from very
long, stable jobs. This can lead to increasing differences in unemployment durations
if both types of worker are in direct competition for few jobs, as it happens in large
recessions where long tenured workers lose their jobs. I provide some evidence of
the effect of search capital differences on the duration of unemployment spells. I do
so by exploiting the variation of people who experience unemployment often (those
in temporary contracts) and those who don’t (in permanent contracts) in Spain to
identify empirically search capital. I find that the more jobs a worker had in the past,
the shorter her unemployment spells are. I also find a positive correlation between
number of jobs and future wages. While these results speak of individual effects, I
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build a dynamic search model to assess the aggregate effects of search capital. The
model incorporates elements of two different literatures: risk aversion and savings
from the ‘turbulence’ literature and the dual labour market environment. This al-
lows me to control for the two main competing theories that could also explain the
correlations found in the empirical part: older individuals have more means to save
assets and more human capital to lose and all individuals prefer a stable stream of
income over a more volatile one. After calibrating the model using the Spanish ad-
ministrative data, I find that search capital improves the fit of the model to the data,
specially for younger workers. Search capital accentuates differences in unemploy-
ment duration across workers of different ages and helps explain why individuals in
their late twenties-early thirties have the highest job finding rates of all - after which
they steadily decline. Lucky workers who find stable jobs become worse searchers
over time, but as long as they are employed this decrease in search capital is not
reflected in the unemployment pool. There only the unlucky workers, who are still
in temporary contracts, remain unemployed.
xii
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On the use of administrative data
for the study of unemployment
1.1 Introduction
Administrative datasets are being increasingly used for labour market research (see
for example Moffitt (1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009),
Tattara and Valentini (2010), Couch et al. (2011), Krueger and Mueller (2011),
Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) among others). They offer many advantages over
traditional Labour Force Surveys, from firm-worker identification to detailed and
extensive working histories (large N, long T). However there are some challenges
when using them to study unemployment. First, these data were not designed for
research, but rather for administrative bookkeeping: who is making contributions
to the social security and who is claiming benefits. This is especially true when un-
employment benefits are contribution-based, so they are proportional to the social
security contributions of the worker in her previous employment. Second, the defini-
tion of unemployment is not the same as the International Labour Office standard.
Although the reception of benefits is in most cases conditioned on active search on
the side of the worker, monitoring may not be perfect. Finally, in some countries the
administration only keeps track of the unemployed while they are receiving benefits.
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The aim of this chapter is to show how to implement two simple expansions in
order to make administrative data ready to be used for the study of unemployment.
First, unemployed workers who run out of benefits but keep searching will appear in
the administrative data as if their spell was over. I add the missing days in between
the end of a registered unemployment spell and the next employment spell to correct
for this. Second, those who are not entitled to unemployment benefits because they
had too short of a tenure in their previous job will also not appear as unemployed.
Using the richness of the data and the institutional setting I identify theses cases
and add these spells into the data.
The main methodological check is to compare the resulting unemployment rate
from the extended administrative data with that of the Labour Force Survey. To
this aim I format the administrative dataset into a quarterly panel structure as
in the Labour Force Survey. The results show evidence that the different expan-
sions achieve their aim of adding the missing unemployment to the administrative
dataset. In particular, the second expansion is crucial for youth unemployment and
for women, who have a higher incidence of part-time and temporary contracts. As
further check I use the information in the Labour Force Survey to reconstruct the
administrative data’s unemployment rate.
Finally I show how the expanded administrative data can help overcome some of
the problems that the Labour Force Survey faces: attrition and changes in survey
design. First, unemployed workers sometimes do not reply to two consecutive in-
terviews, resulting in underestimated unemployment-to-unemployment flows. This
affects exit rates from unemployment. Second, there was a major change in the
survey in 2005 which did not affected stocks, although some flows were severely af-
fected. The MCVL can help to distinguish which jumps correspond to actual events
and which are artificially created as a result of the redesign of the survey.
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The contribution of this chapter is twofold: First, it extends the methodology of
Garćıa Pérez (2008) in adapting the administrative dataset in order make it useful
for research. I provide further systematic guidance using the institutional setting and
the Labour Force Survey as a benchmark. Appendix A provides a detailed guide on
how to do this. Second, it shows how administrative data can address some of the
empirical challenges associated with the Labour Force Survey data.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the two
datasets, their advantages and disadvantages and explains the procedure to build
a quarterly panel from the administrative data; Section 1.3 explains the different
expansions to the administrative data, checking the resulting unemployment rate
against the Labour Force Survey official unemployment rate; Section 1.4 provides
some further robustness checks; Section 1.5 shows how the expanded administrative
data can help to evaluate and interpret two problems with Labour Force Survey
data; Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
This section explains the main characteristics of the two data sources I employ
throughout this chapter: the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS thereafter), elab-
orated by the National Statistics Institute (INE in its Spanish acronym), and the
Continuous Sample of Woking Lives (MCVL thereafter), provided by the Spanish
Social Security. It offers a comparison between the two and briefly explains how to
structure the latter as a quarterly panel.
1.2.1 Description
Official unemployment statistics come from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS
thereafter) which follows a representative sample of over 100,000 people for six con-
secutive quarters, with weighted to reflect population characteristics. I will use these
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weights when reporting stocks, as it corrects for the sampling errors - some groups
are over-represented and some under-represented. The expand of the data I use is
from 1987 to 2013. As other labour force surveys, it classifies workers by asking
them to report their activities in the week of the interview - if they were employed
or if they searched for a job, for example.1 This allows the LFS to observe whether
a worker is out of the labour force and why.2 The LFS is thus structured as a panel.
However, many participants do not reply in all of the six quarters that they are
interviewed, which leads to problems when calculating stocks and more so when
building labour market transitions. These problems are partly corrected by adjust-
ing the weights, which results in consistent stocks over time. Another complication
arises from the changes the survey itself has undertaken over the years. In particular,
two major changes in 2001 and 2005 affected how unemployment was recorded and
produced breaks in some series.3 These changes do not affect, by design, the stocks,
but do alter labour market flows. In Section 1.5 I will explore these issues in more
detail.
The Spanish Continuous Working Life Sample (MCVL thereafter) comprises the
working histories of a 4% sample of the working population for the years 2004-2013.
Similar datasets exist for Germany, Italy, Austria and the US, among other countries
(see Tattara and Valentini (2010) for a table summary). The MCVL stands out as
1To classify labour market status of the population I use the variable Type of Contract for
employees, Current working situation for the self-employed and the variable AOI for unemployed
and out of the labour force individuals. This last variable encompasses the answer to other key
variables (“Were you working this last week?”, “Are you looking for a job?”/“are you ready to work
in the next 15 days?” and “What type of contract do you hold?”). This variable is the one used to
build official unemployment rate series, which are reported in the EUROSTAT and OECD
2In particular, if the respondent is not employed nor looking for a job it asks her to declare the
reason by choosing one of 9 possible answers. These include “studying”, “thinking they are not
going to be able to find a job”, “caring for others” etc.
3The 2001 reform added the requirement for unemployed workers to be available for work in the
next two weeks. This change caused a shift in the stock of unemployed in 2001. But the major
change came in 2005, when the sample was altered to reflect the growing impact of migrant workers
and an electronic way of carrying the survey from quarter was introduced.
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being very accessible and big - there are more than 20 million observations in total
as of 2013. It uniquely identifies workers and firms, allowing to observe job-to-job
transitions and distinguish quits and lay-offs. It also keeps track of self-employment,
something that is excluded in other datasets. The firm and worker identifiers allow
to link the working histories panel to a yearly Income Tax complement, containing
fiscal information about wages, other retributions in kind, unemployment or dis-
ability benefits, severance payments, and any flow of income between the firm and
the worker (or the Social Security and the worker). For self-employed workers and
firm CEOs, it contains declared profits, and although that information is highly
susceptible to misreporting for tax avoidance purposes, it nevertheless provides an
insight into self-employed earnings. These characteristics could in principle allow the
dataset to be treated as a matched employer-employee data. However, as the unit
of measurement is the worker and not the firm, it is very unlikely that we observe
all of the workforce from the firms in the data.4 Alternatively, it also contains a file
that details the taxable income received by the worker in all of their previous spells.
This is not the same as gross wages from the tax data, but as shown in Bonhomme
and Hospido (2017) it can be adapted to study wage and earnings dynamics.
The raw MCVL data are not immediately ready to use as there are not designed
for the purpose of research but for bookkeeping. There are some academic articles
explaining how to clean and format the data (see Lapuerta (2010) or Garćıa Pérez
(2008), for example). In particular Garćıa Pérez (2008) provides a comprehensive
identification of the main problems when dealing with overlapping employment spells
and censored unemployment spells. After implementing most of the cleaning and
formatting procedures there is still the question of how to handle unemployed work-
ers who are not registered within the Social Security. These periods appear as
4It could be argued that the sampling of firms is representative of the universe of firms in Spain,
as the sample is representative of the worker side, it thus should be representative of firms too.
As self employment is represented too, the coverage of small firms is good but few large firms are
represented.
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blanks, gaps between observed spells. This feature is common to other administra-
tive datasets, but in Spain this issue is especially relevant because of the prevalence
of very short and very long unemployment spells. These issues and how to deal with
them are at the core of this chapter.
In principle it would be possible to use the retrospective information of the MCVL
to build a panel earlier than 2004, as we have information on the complete work-
ing histories of workers, dating as far back as the 1960’s. However, Garćıa Pérez
(2008) warns against doing this kind of inference as the sample is representative
of the year that it is collected from. That is, the 2005 file is representative of the
working population of Spain in 2005. In the next years the sample adds new spells
to adapt to demographic changes, but it does not “drop” any worker. The cases
of workers dropping are either migration, transitioning out of the labour force or
deceased.5 Using the 2005 to do any inference on the labour market in 2000 would
cause some relatively minor representativeness problems, as there was a substantial
influx of migrants in the 2000-2005 period. But using the MCVL to look at the
1992 recessions would over-represent younger workers as the average age falls con-
siderably. The sample size of the MCVL increased considerably in 2005 to account
for better representation of different groups, so the MCVL of 2004 is not very well
suited for study. For this reason, I follow Garćıa Pérez (2008) and only use the year
2005 onwards when building stocks, to make it comparable to the LFS. I will use
the 2005 file to account for flows in 2004 as the sampling error of a year is not too
significant. Finally, the potential accuracy gains that can derive from using only the
final wave (2013) can outweigh the problems with representativeness for some appli-
cations. One of these exceptions is unemployment duration, as using the last year
only provides with higher accuracy. Using instead all of the waves can result in more
overlapping spells and discontinuities. Table 1.1 summarises the main characteristics
of the two datasets.
5In this last case, the date is recorded in the MCVL.
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Table 1.1: Data Comparison Table
Labour Force Survey Administrative data
(MCVL)
Description Rotating panel of quarterly
interviews with a sample
size of over 100,000.It is
available since 1987.
A sample of about 1,000,000
job records of people with
any sort of affiliation with
the Social Security. It can
constitute a panel since it
follows most of the same
people over the period 2004-
2012.
Advantages * Detailed and accurate in-
formation for personal char-
acteristics (such as educa-
tion).
*Firm and worker identifiers
allow for the study of job-to-
job transitions (rarely avail-
able in the LFS).
* It has the potential to
track labour status changes
that are made out of the
scope of administrative
records (first job seekers,
informal market jobs,
inactive workers)
* Very accurate informa-
tion on employment spells,
with precise dates of entry
and exit into and out of
jobs/unemployment
* Can be matched to a fis-
cal dataset for wage/benefit
information.
* Consistent through time.
Disadvantages * Fails to capture short term
jobs and some very short
unemployment spells due to
it being a quarterly dataset.
* It can’t track anyone who
has no formal relationship
with the Social Security. As
such, it serves poorly for
tracking people out of the
labour force.
* There are important series
breaks in 1992, 1999, 2001
and 2005.
* For the same reason, it is
also unable to track infor-
mal market activities.
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1.2.2 Prepare the MCVL for use
In order to work with the MCVL to analyse job market variables it is necessary
to at least stablish a reference variable for labour market status and treat some
simultaneous spells. If we also want to make meaningful comparisons with the LFS,
we need to build a panel with one observation per quarter. Laborda (2013) for
example uses this approach. Appendix A provides a detailed guide of the formatting
process. Here I explain the main steps of the procedure to make the MCVL ready
for use in research:
1. Classify the labour status of the worker in each spell
2. Modify overlapping spells and extend censored spells
3. Build a panel by selecting one spells per period of time
Labour Status of the worker
The aim of the first step is to create a variable that classifies workers in four cate-
gories: self-employment, working with a permanent (open-ended) contract, working
with a temporary contract and unemployed. It is important to separate both kinds
of contract because their dynamics are very different, with temporary contracts ac-
counting for 90% of all job creation6 and most of the flows in and out of unemploy-
ment.
The only category missing is out of the labour force. The Social Security does not
provide sufficient information to judge whether someone is participating or not in
the labour market. In order to keep their benefits, unemployed workers are formally
required to: prove they are actively searching for a job, attend job interviews and
not reject job offers. The Employment Centre monitors workers at least each month
6Temporary contracts who expire and are not renewed do not incur into dismissal transfers,
which is the case of termination of open-ended contracts. These contracts always end in dismissal,
quit or retirement.
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upon receiving the payments. A priori, I treat this an sufficient prove of unemploy-
ment.7 Retired workers are not part of the main sample, and their information is
in another linkable dataset. They constitute, according to Garćıa-Pérez, 27% of the
total number of observations in 2007, which is far from the 40% of inactive workers
that the LFS reports for that year. The remaining 13% should be individuals that
are too young or have never participated in the labour force. As these groups are
excluded from the sample, the remaining option is to count periods in which the So-
cial Security has no information on the worker as out of the labour force. This is the
initial treatment I give them, as in previous studies. Later on I relax this assumption.
Three variables contain all the information needed to classify workers in the same
working status as in the LFS:
1. Type of Labour Relationship (TRL) codes the different links each worker has
with the Social Security – working, receiving unemployment benefits. This way
I separate unemployed workers.
2. Contract Type contains the code for each type labour contract.8 There are
557 kinds of different contracts in the registry, but most of them are ”legacy
contracts” that do not exist in the present. Most temporary contracts are
grouped under the 400s numerical codes while regular contracts are coded in
the 100s. This way I distinguish between temporary (which have a specific
termination date) or permanent (open-ended) contracts.9
7This may not be the case if monitoring fails, for example if an unemployed worker that lies
about searching for a job. This is acknowledged by most authors (see for example Garćıa Pérez
(2008), Lapuerta (2010) and Arranz et al. (2011)). Garćıa-Pérez points out that most of these
dropouts from the sample correspond to women and young people, who are less attached to the
labour market.
8There are some kinds of contract that don’t exist any more - usually contracts with some kind
of temporary subsidy created in the 1990’s. These are not relevant for the present study as I focus
in the 2005-2013 period.
9In the particular case of discontinuous workers (those who work only on specific periods of
time every year) I treat them as permanent, as they are subject to firing costs and have no pre
established termination date.
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3. Contribution Class allows for the identification of self-employed workers, as
they have a different arrangement with the Social Security. These correspond
to variable values 500-600.10
Using those three variables suffices to classify most observations, but there are spe-
cial cases: the unemployed close to retirement that choose to pay their contributions
to the social security as if they were employed to boost their pension, discontinuous
and seasonal workers who get a compensation in between working seasons or stu-
dents that receive benefits under apprenticeship contracts. The treatment for these
specific cases is left for appendix A.
Clean overlaps and extend unemployment spells
After classifying the state of the worker, it can still be the case that a worker is
classified in different status at the same time. Garćıa Pérez (2008) recommends to
drop overlapping spells where the worker is simultaneously employed in more than
one firm11 or when the beginning and the end of the spell overlap for a few days.
It can be the case where employed or unemployed individuals are receiving some
form of complementary benefit during their current spell. For example, because of
an incapacitating illness or a widowhood pension. In these cases the best approach
is to keep the employment spell only, and to merge some of these overlapping spells
in unemployment.12
The second step can be omitted if the researcher wants to use the MCVL defi-
nition of unemployment. Garćıa Pérez (2008) recommends to add to unemployment
between two employment spells the missing days before and after the unemployment
10There are some special categories for domestic workers, agriculture workers, farmers and sailors.
I select those who are self-employed in these special regimes.
11These cases are rare in Spain and mostly refer to part-time jobs. However some employees of
the Catholic Church are recorded to have two full-time jobs: one for their religious duties and one
for their other dealings - teaching for example.
12The Social Security records pensions separately, but the pension file can be easily merged with
the main working records file using the individual identifier.
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spell if these are not recorded, especially in the case of days between the end of the
job and the beginning of the unemployment spell. These are likely due to adminis-
trative delays and should be added. In Section 1.3 I analyse the different approaches
to unemployment spells in more detail.
Building the panel
Once each worker has a unique observation for each quarter, we can proceed to build
a panel by only keeping the observations that relate to each quarter of interest. The
easiest approach would be to take the 2013 file and use its retrospective informa-
tion. However, as each year file is representative for the population in that particular
year, using the 2013 retrospectively will lead to a bias in favour of younger workers
in previous years, as discussed before. The second main reason is that is more prac-
tical for handling the data: to mimic the LFS we would need to sample a spell that
lasts beyond the year as separate, different spells. That is, year frequencies allow
for the building of an observation per year per worker, with details of the states in
the different quarters. In this way, each worker ends with an entry for each year she
is in the sample. Using a unique file would require the use of many more auxiliary
variables.
To build the panel I first establish a point in time at which I will evaluate people’s
working states: the two weeks starting the 1st of January, 1st of April, 1st of July
and 1st of October, which coincide with the start of the year’s quarters. Because
some jobs may start after that date, I also consider all the spells in the following
two weeks, until the 15th of each month. The labour status variable will reflect the
relationship each individual have on those weeks: self-employed, open-ended em-
ployee, temporary employee or unemployed.13 Laborda (2013) uses the fifth week or
13This corrects for sort periods in which the worker may not be in either state. For example, it is
likely that many jobs will start on the 7th of January instead of the 1st, due to Christmas holidays
in Spain ending on the 6th.
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each quarter, as the LFS takes place around that date. Most job contracts tend to
start on the first day of the month, so the first weeks of the quarter seem a natural
choice. For workers that have more than one spell in the same two-week period, I
give priority to the longest spell. That is, if a worker starts the two-week obser-
vation window unemployed but end with a job that lasts for one more quarter, I
count her as employed on that quarter. If there is a tie (0.03% of the total number
of observations) I chose employment over unemployment, and self-employment over
employment. This is because some jobs (especially part-time) can be complemented
with unemployment benefits, but that doesn’t mean the worker is unemployed.
1.3 Methodological Check
The challenge is thus how to treat unemployment spells in the MCVL. In the sec-
ond step of the procedure outlined in Section 1.2.2, the researcher needs to take a
stance on what to consider as unemployment, or alternatively as in Alvarez et al.
(2015) consider all the gaps between employment spells as non-employment. In this
section I argue that some extensions that allow us to consider most of these gaps as
unemployment spells, providing a series of methodological checks against the LFS
unemployment series. The motivation of these expansions is to match the unemploy-
ment rates from both datasets, which differ considerably after 2008.
1.3.1 The unemployment gap
The LFS and the MCVL have a different number of observations (an average of
108,136 in the LFS14 and 678,183 in the MCVL) so in order compare the stocks I
express them as shares of the labour force thereafter.
14The weighted labour force survey has a mean of 31,360,266 observations per period – which
amounts to the total population of Spain.
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Figure 1.1 shows the main discrepancy between the MCVL and the LFS: the un-
employment rate. This disparity reaches 10 percentage points by the second quarter
of 2013. The differences persist when unemployment rates are compared by gender
and sex in figures 1.2 and 1.3. The two unemployment rates are closer for men than
for women. For young workers between 20 and 30 years of age, the MCVL unem-
ployment is half of the LFS. For prime aged workers (30-50) the differences are more
modest. The differences are starker for older workers, whose trend and level differs
between the MCVL and the LFS.
The main source of the differences comes from the different definitions of unem-
ployment they use:
• The LFS considers a person unemployed if: (1) they are not currently employed
(2) are actively looking for a job and (3) they are ready to start working within
the next 15 days.
• The MCVL considers a person unemployed if: (1) she has been in the social
security system before (had a previous job) and (2) is receiving unemployment
benefits.
This means the MCVL excludes all unemployed whose benefits have expired. The
Spanish Social Security does not provide any other benefit for those who exhaust
their unemployment compensation, so all unemployed beyond 2 years15 disappear
from the registry. As long term unemployment reached 50% of total unemployment
by the end of 2013, this is the principal potential source of disagreement. The first
expansion deals with this issue by extending observed spells until the start of the
next job or the end of the sample.
15this limit is expanded to an absolute maximum of 4 years for workers with family obligations
or other special circumstances
13
Figure 1.1: Unemployment rate in Spain
Figure 1.2: Unemployment rate by sex
Figure 1.3: Unemployment rate by age
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The Social Security also excludes all unemployed without the right to claim un-
employment compensation (who have been employed for less than a year in the last
4 years) and unemployed that have not held a job yet. The second expansion aims to
recover these spells (usually related to young workers in short lived temporary con-
tracts) by adding gaps between employment spells of those without the right to claim.
Finally the Social Security may be counting as unemployed some inactive workers
by the definition of the LFS (not actively searching for a job and/or not ready to
work in the next 15 days). This would imply the MCVL has a bias upwards with
respect to the LFS. But this is not what we observe in the data, except for older
workers.16
1.3.2 Closing the unemployment gap: LTU expansion
Given the importance of long term unemployment in the last years in Spain, it is nat-
ural to start by adding the days elapsed between the recorded end of the unemploy-
ment spell and the start of the next job. This is already suggested by Garćıa Pérez
(2008) as a necessary treatment to work with the MCVL. This extension is easy to
implement but has a shortcoming: many of the long term unemployed have not found
a job by the end of the sample. This is reflected on the small difference between
Original and Only finished spells unemployment rates in figure 1.4: the difference in
trend and level of unemployment widens from 2009 onwards. In fact, comparing it
with the original MCVL series, it barely makes a difference.
The LTU Expansion adds all the unfinished unemployment spells by the end of
2013, as well as extending the duration of registered unemployment spells between
jobs as before. After this expansion both trend an level are very close to the LFS, as
16We can observe when an individual is receiving unemployment subsidies immediately before
retirement in the MCVL, so they are excluded from the plot.
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shown in figure 1.4. The expanded series is still below the LFS by 3.7-2.5 percentage
points by 2013. This shows us that if we want to match the trend of the LFS unem-
ployment rate, we need to add unfinished spells. How many depends on the sample
size. 2013 was the worst year of the recession in Spain, so many unfinished spells are
to be expected. But if a researcher has access to further years, most of the difference
may be captured by adding the finished unemployment spells only. I also condition
the extension of unfinished unemployment spells on being at most of 2 years.17
17Robustness checks can be used to asses if the 2 year maximum duration is a good threshold.
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1.3.3 Closing the unemployment gap: STU expansion
Other kind of unemployment the MCVL is missing is people without the right to
claim. This will be the case of:
• Quits to unemployment. Quits do not have the right to unemployment com-
pensation.
• New entrants to the labour market (with no previous employment record)
• Temporary workers with employment spells below the minimum requirement -
less than a year of tenure in the last 4 years.
• Self-employed workers who have no right to unemployment compensation.
Notice that all of these cases are not the main source of discrepancy between the
LFS and the Social Security, as the the first expansion is already very close to the
LFS. Underestimating long term unemployment a bigger issue, but capturing short
term spells is important for matching youth unemployment rates. Therefore I refer
to the resulting expanded unemployment series as the Short Term Unemployment
(STU) expansion.
To identify these spells, I chose to include all gaps between employment spells
that last at least 15 days and at least one of the following conditions:
• The worker quit her last job.
• The worker was self-employed in her last spell.
• The worker does not have enough contribution periods to be eligible.18 19)
18The threshold is less than 360 days of employment, according to Spanish legislation.
19It is worth noting that the law in Spain does not allow to claim benefits that were not consume
in the last unemployment spell if the worker wants the past employment spell to count for future
benefits. For example, say a worker has 3 months left of UB, and finds a 6 month job; after the job
ends, she can chose to claim the 3 missing months from before or the 2 months she has accumulated
with the last job. She can’t have both.
17
Table 1.1: STU Expansion spells, by type
Quit Self-employment No right to UI
Total 151,461 91,972 551,272
Percentage 19.06 11.57 69.37
Notes: Elaborated with data from t he MCVL, waves 2005-2013
In addition to these restrictions I add the requirement that the worker is not to be
recalled to work on the same firm. The reason for this is that there is a good chance
that the worker knew that she was going to be called back and thus had no incentives
to search. This is particularly important because employers could use these tactic to
extend the maximum duration of temporary contracts. That is, instead of renewing
the worker beyond the two month period, the firm asks the worker to take a period
of leave and then return.
The conditions imposed make it very unlikely that a person detached from the
labour market would qualified for an unemployment extension. Table 1.1 shows the
different spells that are added in the STU expansion by each case. Most of them do
not have the right to claim unemployment benefits, but a non-trivial amount also
come from self-employment and quits. Figure 1.5 shows the histogram and empirical
CDF of the ages of the unemployed at the time of the start of their unemployment
spell, broken down by expansion. Unemployed individuals from the STU expansion
are overwhelmingly younger, with 80% of them under 40. In terms of what was
their previous spell, figure 1.6 shows that they are more likely to come from tempo-
rary contracts than in the LTU expansion, and their next spell is also more likely
to be another temporary job. This gap increases if we consider that virtually all
unemployed workers coming from self-employment are in the STU expansion. If we
exclude self-employment, 86% of all previous spells in the STU addition are tem-
porary jobs, while the LTU and the original only have 70% and 74% respectively.
18
Figure 1.5: Age Distribution by Expansion
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Appendix A.2 analyses these spells in more detail.
After adding these spells, the MCVL unemployment rate gets closer to the LFS
after 2009, as figure 1.7 shows. There is still an overestimation of unemployment
before 2009, but as for the end of 2013 the differences are small. It is not surprising
that the STU expansion adds more unemployment relative to the Long-Term expan-
sion in the 2005-2008 period. These years coincide with the construction boom and
the highest rates of temporary contracts over total employment. In the following
years the gap is reduced as long term unemployment increases its incidence. The
trend is similar to the Long-Term expansion and the LFS.















































































We can gain some insights into the difference between the two expansions by
looking at the unemployment rates broken down by gender (figure 1.8) and age
(figure 1.9). By gender, the Short-Gaps expansion brings the MCVL closer to the
LFS. This is expected as women are more commonly employed in the services sector,
where temporary contracts are very common. It is less successful for men, in par-
ticular before 2008. This again can relate to the use of temporary contracts among
construction workers, but notice as well that even the original MCVL overestimates
unemployment in this period. This suggests that men are less likely to report to
be searching for a job when claiming benefits. The overestimation of unemployment
persists even after onset of the recession.
By age things are also clear: the STU expansion helps reconcile the unemploy-
ment rates of younger workers, in a way the Long-Term expansion is not able to
match. There is a small positive gap in the 2006-2008 years, again likely driven by
males on temporary contracts. For middle-aged workers the differences mirror those
in figure 1.7, as it is higher than the LFS (in particular for the 2005-2008 period).
Here the Long Term expansion performs arguably better. For older workers the STU
expansion barely makes a difference over the Long-Term one. Still both offer a more
coherent picture than the original MCVL series. For this age group, notice the over-
estimation of unemployment even for the original MCVL in the 2005-2008 period.
Here it becomes clear that the definition of unemployment matters: most of those
who report not to be looking for a job “because they think they are note going to
find one” are in this age group. Although they are receiving unemployment benefits
and would like to work, they report a low willingness to search, which makes them
inactive in the LFS. The big disparity in their unemployment rates does not affect
however the overall unemployment rate, as the share of older workers in total un-
employment is small. Both expansions improve on the trend of the original MCVL,
especially for middle-age workers and the LTU expansion.
21
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1.4 Further Robustness checks
In the previous section I created different unemployment series using the information
from the MCVL and institutional setting. I then checked the resulting stocks against
the LFS. This section provides a further check comparing the extent of self-reported
unemployment without benefits in the LFS to the expansions of the MCVL. This
check is interesting because it shows that as it was possible to go from the MCVL
to LFS definition of unemployment, the reverse path can also be traced up to a
certain extent. The methodological differences between the two datasets mean that
the match is not perfect, but nevertheless very close.
The fact that the LTU expansion managed to bring the MCVL closer to the LFS
was derived directly from the definition of unemployment in the MCVL. But we
can use the information from the LFS to check if there is any clear trend in benefit
expiration that would explain why the LTU expansion gets closer to the data. This
check can be done by looking at a variable in the LFS called “Relationship with
the Employment Office”, that asks individuals if they are registered as unemployed
and if they are receiving benefits. This variable thus classifies individuals in four
categories, ‘Registered, with Benefits’, ‘Registered, No Benefits’, ‘Non-registered’
and ‘Doesn’t know’. The first case will be recorded in the MCVL, while the second
should not be recorded. These unemployed without benefits are the ones that the
LTU correction is targeting. The third case corresponds to job seekers that are not
registered with the public Employment Office. These cases will not be recorded by
the Social Security, and are the ones the STU expansion seeks to recover.
Figure 1.10 shows the evolution of these stocks (in millions) in the 2005-2013
period. The ‘Registered, with Benefits’ line looks very similar to the original MCVL
series, which highlights again that these are the only unemployed captured in it.
The stock of ‘Registered, No Benefits’ on the other hand looks more similar to the
23
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expanded series, with a big increase after 2008. The ‘Non-registered, No Benefits’
stocks do not change substantially in the period, increasing slightly after 2008. These
trends are reassuring, as they correspond to the different expansions.
In figure 1.11 I use this variable and the labour stocks from the LFS to build
alternative measurements of unemployment. The first panel shows the the original
MCVL unemployment series (in red) has very similar trend to the LFS series were
only the unemployed who are receiving benefits are considered. However, the MCVL
is higher and corresponds to only the registered unemployed before 2005. The sec-
ond panel shows that the LTU expansion matches closely with the case where only
those registered in the Social Security (with or without benefits) are considered, in
particular after 2008. This provides additional evidence that considering only those
who are registered in the employment office is not enough to account for unemploy-
ment after 2008. The last panel shows how the STU expansion achieves a closer
unemployment rate to the LFS when all of the unemployed are considered after the
recession, but overestimates unemployment before. As discussed in Section 1.3.3,
this likely reflects that the MCVL captures more frictional unemployment than the
LFS, which was more relevant before 2005 than after.
1.5 Using the MCVL to enrich the LFS
As the unemployment rate from the expanded MCVL is similar to the LFS, we
can use this to compare other labour market magnitudes. In this section I will be
focusing on labour market flows, which are problematic in the LFS for two reasons:
(1) respondents not replying on consecutive interviews, which affects the flows and
(2) changes in the design of the survey which changes workers labour market status,
in particular in 2005. The aim of this section is to show how the MCVL can clarify
these issues.
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1.5.1 Attrition and Labour Market Flows
The LFS is a rotating, panel, such that each household is interview in 6 consecutive
quarters. I define attrition as a respondent who is not in her last interview fails
to report on the subsequent interview. The size of the attrition bias has not been
constant over time nor does it affect all individuals in the same way. Figure 1.12
shows the share of respondents who are not in their last interview and report being
unemployed any given quarter, but do not respond to the survey in the next quarter.
For example, about 8% of all individuals reporting being unemployed in the 2000-
2005 period do not respond in the next quarter. After 2005, that number shoots up
to over 15%, reaching 20% in some quarters.
The LFS corrects for this problem by changing the weights of the observations
each quarter and introducing more people in the sample. This makes stocks consis-
tent over time. However if we want to calculate labour market transitions the weights
do not solve the problem. This problem is common among labour force surveys, and
26
usually resolved as in Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013) and Elsby et al. (2015):
Taking the stocks as given, but treating the transition rates as biased because of
attrition. Then we can calculate the transition rates that are consistent with the
evolution of the stocks.
In all of these cases the stocks are given by the sum of flows in each quarter. For
example, consider the transition from state X to Y as the number of observed indi-
vidual transitions between X and Y , divided by the sum of all individual transitions





Assume that there is attrition in this data, but that it does not affect the tran-
sitions from X to Y , but a number of remainders (Xt+1|Xt) are missing. Then the
denominator would be lower than what it should be, as the non-respondents are
taken out of the sample. Consider instead the the transition rate defined as in equa-
tion 1.2 below: number of observed individual transitions between X and Y , divided





In this way the transition rate would be consistent with the data. In practice,
attrition can affect all of the rates out of state X, so the resulting bias of λXYt,flows
is ambiguous. We can consider the case of λXYt,stocks as the extreme case when all of
the attrition comes from stayers. That is, the non-respondents are not transiting to
any other state in the next quarter. Figure 1.13 shows the evolution of λXYt,flows and
λXYt,stocks from 1987 to 2013. There is not much difference between the two except in
the flows between unemployment and temporary contracts. Here the gap is very no-
20I define transitions rates forward - from one quarter to the next. The literature tends to use
the backwards approach - transitions from the previous quarter to the present. This distinction
does not matter for results.
27































































































































































































LFS (stocks) LFS (flows)
28
ticeable in the 2005-2008 period, which coincides with the attrition ‘jump’ in figure
1.12. The gap is also noticeable for the temporary to unemployment (TU) rate after
2008. The MCVL does not suffer from this bias, as we can observe the changes in
labour status of workers with more precision – up to daily frequency. The definitions
of unemployment are different, as discussed, but given that the expansions get them
closer we can compare the resulting transition rates to the LFS. As the MCVL does
not suffer from attrition issues, comparing the LFS and the MCVL can give us some
insight into the source of the discrepancies in the LFS flows due to attrition.
Figures 1.14 - 1.15 compare the flows resulting for the LFS to the MCVL. LFS
(flows) shows the transition rates from the LFS calculated as in equation 1.1 (the
denominator being the sum of transitions) while LFS (stocks) shows it as in equa-
tion 1.2 (the denominator being the stock).21 The blue lines correspond to the LTU
expansion of the MCVL and the red line to the LTU expansion. Given the increase
in attrition of unemployed workers in 2005, I have taken back the MCVL to 2003
to have a larger window for comparison.22 In general, the level and trend of the
flows is close between the two datasets. The flows from the MCVL have higher
seasonal variation because it captures short employment spells that the LFS can’t.
Conversely, the LFS series are smoother because of its quarterly frequency. Notice
that the flows version of the LFS is always higher than the stocks version, which
would be consistent with the non-respondents being unemployed the next quarter as
well.
The left panel of figure 1.14 shows that there are important differences between
the stocks and flows version of the LFS in the 2004-2008 period. This could be
indicative that the UT flow is not affected by attrition, but the denominator is. In
21When calculating the stock, I naturally exclude those who are in their last interview, as they
would not reply in the next quarter because they are out of the sample.
22The observations from before 2005 are taken from the 2005 file, so there might be some repre-
sentatively issues. I’m assuming these are not substantial for 2 years earlier in the sample.
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this way, the non-respondents are not likely going to come from workers that take in
temporary jobs. This discrepancy coincides with a higher discrepancy between the
LTU and STU expansions of the MCVL. The differences between the expansions are
clear: the STU expansion is capturing more movements into and out of temporary
contracts, corresponding to more frictional unemployment. After 2008 however all
series converge. This suggests that the attrition bias is partly driven by the unem-
ployed without right to claim benefits flowing in and out of temporary contracts,
which are not adequately captured in the LFS due to its frequency.
The right panel of figure 1.14 shows that the unemployment to permanent flows
are higher in the MCVL, but the differences are small - notice that the scale is only
from 0 to 8%. The divergence of the MCVL before 2004 can be partly explained
by contract modifications adjustment not being marked before 2005 and it is a re-
minder that the data can’t be take retrospectively without major problems. As for
figure 1.15, the same conclusions carry over: the STU expansion is adding some
short spells from temporary contracts that otherwise would be taken as job-to-job
transition. The LFS does not capture well these quick changes and has a tendency
to smooth them out, so both LFS series are below the STU expansion. This changes
after the recession, as the volume of turnovers increases considerably. The LTU ex-
pansion matches quite closely the LFS (stocks) series.
In sum, the expanded MCVL is very close to the LFS, and helps explain that
the attrition bias of the LFS is in part related to short-term unemployment spells
coming from temporary contracts. Further research would have to confirm this, but
the comparison with the MCVL points in this direction.
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1.5.2 Changes in Survey Design
Attrition is not the only challenge when computing flows with the LFS: changes in
the structure of the interview have also cause several discontinuities. These breaks
are not present in stocks, because the National Institute of Statistics ensures that
the stocks are consistent over time. Figure 1.16 shows one of the main breaks in the
flows between different types of contracts (TP and PT).23





























































































































































The transition rate between temporary to permanent was between 4% and 5%
before 2005, which was consistent with the literature on contract upgrading (see
Güell and Petrongolo (2007) for example). After the break it shoots up to 12% (16%
following the flows calculation), almost a 200% increase. There is another spike in
2006 but it is explained by a labour market reform that happened at that time.24
23Other flow rates that suffer breaks relate to inactive workers. But since the MCVL can’t speak
for them, then there is nothing administrative data can add to that question.
24All temporary contracts converted to permanent before 2007 benefited from a tax exemption
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The MCVL flow, on the other hand, suffer no break in 2005, but it does peak at
the same time as the LFS. This could be used as supporting evidence that the TP
conversion rate increased after 2005, but at a smaller rate (close to 6%). The change
in the LFS must be due to the change in the survey, that implied some spurious
classification errors in order to get consistent stocks.
The right panel of figure 1.16 shows starker case, where the permanent to tempo-
rary flow (PT) increases from 1% to 6% then slowly falls back to its previous level.
In contrast, the MCVL only increases to 1.7% before falling after the recession. In
this way the MCVL helps to interpret the LFS as coming from spurious transitions
in the change in survey. The attrition problem of unemployed workers can be partly
due to the same change.
1.6 Conclusion
Administrative datasets are a great source of information for economists, but they
also present some challenges. In this chapter I analyse the case of the Spanish Mues-
tra Contiua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL), a rich administrative dataset of working
histories of a representative sample of the Spanish workforce. This dataset is rich in
information, but in its original format it has important shortcomings how it records
unemployment spells. In this chapter I present a simple, systematic method to ex-
pand the original dataset by including two kinds of unemployment that the original
MCVL struggles to cover: long term and short term unemployment.
Workers whose unemployment benefits expire ‘drop’ out of the sample, in that
the days between benefit expiration and next employment spell are missing in the
scheme. Firms reacted very strongly by upgrading many temporary contracts in the last quarter of
2006.This is suggestive of firms using temporary contracts instead of permanent contracts because
the former are cheaper. A simple tax rebate is enough to overcome all of the screening problems
that the firm may have and would induce it to upgrade them to permanent positions.
33
MCVL. What I label the LTU Expansion adds these missing days. Given the rise in
long term unemployment in Spain after the Great Recession, failing to include the
unemployed whose benefits have expired underestimates unemployment and presents
spells that are artificially shorter.
Some workers do not have the right to claim unemployment benefits. Although
this is not the case of most of the unemployed, it is common among workers with
short employment tenures and always the case with self-employed workers and quits.
By using the information in the MCVL, I identify these cases and add the gaps
between employment spells that correspond to these. I show that doing this helps
match the unemployment rate from the LFS after the recession, but it is above the
LFS before. I argue that given the nature of these spells the LFS would struggle
to capture them, as a quarterly survey its smooths out much of this frictional un-
employment. I provide further robustness checks using the LFS variable coding the
relationship with the employment office and taking a closer look to the added un-
employment spells.
I then use the MCVL to improve on the LFS in two main aspects: attrition bias
from unemployed individuals failing to respond two consecutive quarters and changes
in the survey that generate spurious labour market flows. The flows from the MCVL
closely match the ones from the LFS, and where there are noticeable differences (for
example in the unemployment to temporary transition rate) they help understand
the sources of bias of the LFS.
Applying the proposed extensions to the MCVL makes it usable for research on
unemployment. In the rest of this thesis I use this dataset for two such applications
relating to long term unemployment.
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Decomposition à la ABS: Evidence
from Spain
Note: This chapter is based on my work with my supervisor, Maia Güell. Maia has
agreed that the essay can appear within this thesis, and that it represents a substan-
tial contribution on my part. In particular, I carried out the data handling, main
statistical work, adapted the methodology in section 2.2, provided the description in
section 2.3.5, contributed to the description of the data in section 2.3 and to the
analysis in section 2.4.
2.1 Introduction
Much has been said about the duality of the labour market in Spain in which some
workers have secure permanent jobs while others have short temporary contracts (see
for example Dolado, Garćıa-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002)). Another consequence of
temporary contracts is the duality among unemployed workers by which the share
of short term unemployment has increased but those with long durations have more
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difficulties in leaving unemployment (see for instance, Güell and Hu (2006)).
In this chapter we revisit the study of the unemployment duration distribution.
Existing studies of unemployment duration typically use self-reported information
from labour force surveys. Instead, we use precise information on spells from admin-
istrative data. We follow the recent method proposed by Alvarez, Borovičková, and
Shimer (2014) for estimating the different components of the duration of unemploy-
ment using administrative data and have applied it to Austria. In this chapter we
to apply this method using Spanish Administrative data as in Chapter 1. The goal
of this chapter is to compare the decomposition of the duration of unemployment of
these two very different countries using comparable administrative data.
Traditionally, unemployment duration has been studied through the lense of du-
ration models, which generally assume a parametric structure of the hazard function,
distinguishing between duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity parame-
ters. These methods require long panel data (i.e., large T ) as well as functional form
assumptions. The method proposed by Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014) is
a more statistical approach that directly estimates the relative contribution of each
component to the variance of any potential duration variables, unemployment dura-
tion in particular. This approach requires fewer assumptions and as long as the data
has a large number of observations (i.e., large N), a small number of observations
per individual suffice (i.e., small t). In particular, the method can be estimated with
just two completed spells of a given labour market status per individual. The nature
of administrative data make this method a natural fit.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. The first one is methodological. As
explained in Chapter 1, administrative data offer several advantages with respect to
standard labour force survey data. In this case, administrative data has precise in-
formation on spell duration rather than self-reported information from survey data.
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But as explained in Chapter 1, the administrative data were not designed to study
unemployment nor unemployment duration so they need to be augmented in order
to use them for unemployment analysis. In particular, in this chapter, this affects
the number of unemployed individuals observed, their unemployment duration as
well as the spells being compared. As in Chapter 1, we deal with the data issues
in a systematic way by using information from the Spanish Labour Force Survey as
well as labour market institutions information. This is important because we find
that estimates are sensitive to the treatment of these issues. The degree and nature
of such data issues—which also interact with country’s labour market institutions—
are country-specific. The complexity of the Spanish labour market is such that we
hope that by addressing these data challenges for the Spanish case would generate a
general enough guidance that is useful for applying this method to other countries.
Some of these issues are dealt in Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014) already
and in this chapter we generalize this further by focusing on such complex labour
market.
The second contribution of the chapter is the application to Spain, a high un-
employment rate country with dual labour market dynamics, and its comparison to
Austria. The Spanish case is also particularly relevant in this context because of the
high quality of the Spanish social security data, featuring large N as well as large
t. This also allows us to also study how the composition of the duration of unem-
ployment changes along the business cycle. This is something that was not done
in the original paper as Austria has a much more stable labour market throughout
the cycle. Surprisingly we find that Spain and Austria, two very different labour
markets, actually do not differ much in the differential components of the duration
of unemployment.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the new
method by Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014) in detail. Section 2.3 explains
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the data used and the necessary treatment done to use the data for our purposes.
Section 2.4 explains our results for Spain as well as the comparison with Austria. This
section also includes results along the business cycle. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The ABS method
In this section, we explain the method proposed by Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer
(2014) in more detail. The starting point is to assume that our outcome of interest,
unemployment duration (y), is a random variable drawn independently for each








(y − µy)2dFi(y) (2.1)
Where µy is the population mean and n the population size.
The population variance can be decomposed into two components that are la-
belled the within and the between components. The within component is the variance







Where σ2i is the variance of individual i’s two spells. The between component







(µi − µ̄y)2 (2.3)
Where µi is the mean duration of individual i’s two spells. Consider the following
two extreme cases as in Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014). First, all individ-
uals draw from different, individual-specific distributions but there are no differences
within individuals. In this case, the total variance in unemployment duration would
be attributable to individual heterogeneity. Now consider the opposite case, where
all individuals draw from the same distribution function, so the within variance ac-
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counts for all variance and the between variance is zero as there is no heterogeneity
among individuals. Imagine also that duration of unemployment does not affect
the exit rate from unemployment. In this case, the total variance in unemployment
duration observed would come from the distribution function F (y) itself. This com-
ponent is labelled as “constant-hazard within variance” as this would be the natural
model in this case.
Consider next that, while keeping all individuals homogeneous, the probability
to leave unemployment depends on elapsed duration in unemployment. This means
that the distribution function depends on duration t, F (y, t). The longer in unem-
ployment, the longer it takes to leave unemployment. This is what the literature has
referred as “negative duration dependence” and Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer
(2014) refer to “excess within variance”.
This decomposition is done by acknowledging a key implication of the constant
hazard model: the population mean and variance should be both equal to 1/h,
where h is the hazard rate of leaving unemployment any given period. Then we can
decompose the within variance (σ2w) into “excess within variance” (or the difference
between the population mean and variance) and “constant-hazard within variance”.






(σ2i − µ2i ) (2.4)
If the hazard rate is non-increasing and non-constant, σi > µi and the excess
variance would be positive. This is what one should expect if there is the so-called
“negative duration dependence” (ie. the longer in unemployment, the longer it is









2.2.1 Estimation with two spells
Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014) show that two completed spells per indi-
vidual are enough to identify the three different components mentioned above. In
particular, they show how to build consistent estimators for all of the above using
only two spells.
Suppose that we observe two spells, yi,1 and yi,2 for individual i. Then the





















((yi,1 − µ̂y)2 + (yi,2 − µ̂y)2) (2.7)








For the between variance component we need unbiased estimators for the squares
of the individual al populations means (µ2i and µ2y) as shown in equation 2.3. These
can be shown1 to be:
Eµi = µ̂2i − σ̂2i





1For details refer to Alvarez et al. (2014) section 3.2.
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i − µ̂2i ) (2.11)
In the particular case where we decompose the natural logarithm of the duration
of unemployment, the constant hazard component is always equal to π2/6, while the















For all of this analysis it is crucial to have a large number of observations (large
n) so that the estimators are as close as possible to the true components. Notice how
the number of individual observations J is not important as long as the n is large.
In this way a long panel is not necessary for the estimation.
More details can be found in Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014).2
2.3 Data
As in Chapter 1, we use the Spanish Social Security data. It is called the “Spanish
Continuous Working Life Sample” (MCVL, the Spanish acronym, hereafter) which
comprises the working histories of a 4% sample of the working population for the
2In particular, they relax the assumption that the distribution of the two spells is the time-
invariant. In this case, regressing duration on the number of spell is enough to control for changes
in Fi through time.
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years 2004-2013. Relevant to this chapter is the large number of observations both in
terms of individuals at any point in time as well as the large number of years available.
As explained in Chapter 1 these data were not designed to study the labour market,
they were designed to have an account of employed workers (who contribute to
the social security) and of unemployed workers entitled to unemployment insurance
(who have to be paid by the social security). Therefore the data will display blanks
whenever workers are not in one of these two categories. The data needs to be
augmented before using to study the labour market. In the following subsections,
we explain again the key data expansions explored in Chapter 1 needed for this
particular application explored in this chapter. As in Alvarez, Borovičková, and
Shimer (2014), for this application we will need the first two consecutive spells of
unemployment observed in the data for all individuals.
2.3.1 Data expansions
As in Chapter 1 (Lafuente (2017)), we will make data expansions in a systematic
way by using information from the Spanish Labour Force Survey as well as labour
market institutions information. In particular, we will do the following 3 expansions
to deal with: unemployment duration, the number of unemployed workers observed
and the spells being compared.
2.3.2 Duration of unemployment in Administrative data
The first issue of administrative data is with respect to unemployment duration. Re-
call that only unemployed workers receiving unemployment insurance are observed
in the data. Once their benefits run out, if they are still unemployed, they appear as
blank in the data. This implies that unless the data are augmented, unemployment
duration will be underestimated. Table 2.1 illustrates this point with an example of
a worker during three consecutive spells. The first row displays the labour market
status of a worker in reality and the second row displays what appears in the admin-
istrative data.
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The data displays cases that look as the example in Table 2.1. There is a worker
with a first spell in unemployment and receiving unemployment insurance. In this
case both the data and reality coincide. In the second spell, the data are blank
while the reality could be that the worker is still unemployed but does not receive
unemployment insurance anymore or that the person went out of the labour force.
Finally, in the third spell the worker is employed and the data reflects this.
Table 2.1: Duration of unemployment
Example. LTU expansion
spell 1 spell 2 spell 3
Reality: U with UI (i) U run out UI, (ii) out LF E
Data: Registered U blank E
Notes: U stands for unemployed, UI for unemployment insurance, LF for labour force
and E for employed.
The key here is spell 2. If indeed the worker continued to be unemployed (with-
out insurance), then unless the data are augmented we would be underestimating
unemployment duration (only counting spell 1). It is likely that in this example the
worker indeed continued to be unemployed given that in spell 3 the worker is back
to employment. Also, given the fact that we concentrate on the first two completed
spells of unemployment observed in the data for any individual this implies that gen-
erally workers are going to be relatively young and inactivity is a less likely event.
As stated, we will look for information in the labour force survey in order to fill this
blank in the data. Using the Spanish LFS we find that as many as 88% unemployed
workers who run out of unemployment insurance continue to be unemployed in the
period afterward. Accordingly, as a first approximation we replace all the blanks of
cases as in Table 2.1 with unemployment status. Admittedly, this is a broad brush
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solution but it turns out to be very successful in this case. As explained in Chapter
1, this approached was also used by Garćıa Pérez (2008).
After implementing this data expansion that we label as LTU expansion, we doc-
ument the following three facts. First, the unemployment duration data in the LFS
and the MCVL become more comparable. Figure 2.1 displays a histogram of the
duration of (incompleted) unemployment in months for 2013 (third quarter) with
the LFS data, the original MCVL and the MCVL after the LTU expansion. As can
be seen the original MCVL puts more weight into shorter durations than the LFS,
but after the addition, the LFS and the MCVL are much more comparable.3
Figure 2.1: Duration in months of (uncompleted) unemployment in 2013 (III), LTU
expansion
3Note however that the duration reported in the LFS has issues too: it is self-reported, the data
frequency is quarterly and there are problems with attrition for unemployed workers (see section
1.5.1 in Chapter 1).
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Second, we focus on the duration of the first completed unemployment spell ob-
served for each individual in the data. As Figure 2.2 shows, the original MCVL
displays pronounced spikes that coincide with the end of unemployment benefits
(e.g., at 3, 4 and 6 months), see Chapter 1. This again, implies underestimating du-
ration as workers may continue unemployed without benefits. The figure also shows
that after the LTU expansion, these spikes are smaller.
Figure 2.2: Duration in weeks of completed unemployment spells, 2005-2013, LTU
expansion
Third, as shown in Chapter 1, the unemployment rate series using the MCVL
after this addition becomes closer to the LFS (see Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1).
Other cases that appear in the data are such that there is a first spell of registered
unemployment (i.e., worker is unemployed and receives unemployment insurance) fol-
lowed by a blank thereafter. That is, the first and second spell look like the example
in Table 2.1. However, note that these are cases displaying right-censoring. Also
note that for this application, we will not be using such observations as the mini-
mum requirement is two completed spells.
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2.3.3 In between employment spells
We now turn to the second issue of administrative data, which relates to the labour
force status in between two observed employment spells. This is likely to be un-
employment spells without unemployment insurance. It could also be job-to-job
movements. To the extend that this is an unemployment spell, unless the data are
augmented, the number of unemployed workers will be underestimated. Table 2.2
illustrates this point with an example of a worker during five consecutive spells (in
order to include two potential completed spells of unemployment). As before, the
first row displays the labour markets status of a worker in reality while the second
row displays what appears in the administrative data.
Table 2.2: Number of unemployed
Example. STU expansion
spell 1 spell 2 spell 3 spell 4 spell 5
Reality: E U no UI, JtoJ or out LF E U no UI, JtoJ or out LF E
Data: E blank E blank E
Notes: U stands for unemployed, UI for unemployment insurance, JtoJ for job-to-job
transitions and E for employed.
The data displays cases that are two employment spells with a blank in between,
as in the example in Table 2.2. There is a worker with several spells in employment,
in which case the data and reality coincide. These employment spells are in-between
other spells in which the data are blank. These spells could be unemployment with-
out insurance or they could also be job-to-job transitions or even spells out of the
labour force. It is crucial to be able to distinguish between these possibilities as much
as possible, otherwise the number of unemployment spells could be underestimated.
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We proceed as follows. We can distinguish among two cases. Please note that
the MCVL provides two key pieces of information: the duration of the spell and
the identity of the firm when employed. The first case corresponds to employment
in spells 1 and 3 (or spells 3 and 5) in the same firm. In this case, as explained
in Chapter 1, we would consider this as a recall and, therefore, spell 2 (or spell 4)
would not be considered as unemployment nor out of the labour force.
The second case corresponds to employment in spells 1 and 3 (or spells 3 and
5) in different firms, and the spells in between employment spells (i.e. spells 2 or
4). In this case, it could be unemployment, (longer) job-to-job transitions or out of
the labour force. One solution to these type of observations would be to treat them
as non-employment as in Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014). In this chapter,
however, we would like to go further in trying to distinguish unemployment from
other situations by using complementary information. In this case, we use institu-
tional information, that is, legislation on unemployment insurance that establishes
who is eligible for unemployment insurance or not. We note that in this case, these
blank spells in the data are fairly short and in this sense information in the labour
force survey is not that useful since the Spanish LFS is quarterly and short spells are
not easy to identify. However, legislation on unemployment insurance allows us to
assign individually whether these spells correspond to situations with no right to un-
employment insurance. Those that do have the right of unemployment insurance, we
consider them as either job-to-job transitions or out of the labour force. The reason
being that if they were unemployed the administrative data would capture that since
they have benefits. However, for those that do not have the right of unemployment
insurance it could be one of the following three cases: (i) wage earners with too short
accumulated tenure in past employment (usually coming from temporary contracts);
(ii) self-employed workers ; or (iii) workers that have quit. In these cases, we replace
the blanks at the individual level with unemployment status. We find that around
81% of the blanks in this category do not have the right of unemployment insurance
51
and thus we replace the blanks with unemployment status. While 19% of the blanks
in this category do have the right of unemployment insurance and are therefore not
replaced by unemployment status.
In sum, this data expansion implies that the blanks in Table 2.2 could be either
be a recall, a job-to-job movement, out of the labour force, or an unemployment
spell. In the first three cases, the data is left unaffected. But in the latter we replace
the blank with an unemployment spell. After implementing this data expansion that
we label as short term unemployment addition (STU expansion), we document the
following three facts:
1. First, we add the new data to the previous Figure 2.1 and get a reduce the
discrepancy with respect to the LFS, especially for short durations, see Figure
2.3 below.
2. Second, we add the new data to the previous Figure 2.2 and the pronounced
spikes that coincide with the end of unemployment benefits get further reduced,
see Figure 2.4 below.
3. Third, as shown in Chapter 1, the unemployment rate series using the MCVL
after this addition become closer to the LFS (see Figure 1.7 in Chapter 1).
2.3.4 On the spell number
In order to implement the method proposed Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer
(2014), we select the first two completed unemployment spells observed for every
individual. This is in principle straightforward, except that it can be the case that
some unemployment spells are not detected in the original data as explained in the
previous subsection. Once the data have been augmented as explained in subsection
2.3.3, it can be the case that the first two spells observed are not the same as the
first two spells in the original raw data.
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Figure 2.3: Duration in months of (uncompleted) unemployment in 2013 (III), STU
expansion
Figure 2.4: Duration in weeks of completed unemployment spells, 2005-2013, STU
expansion
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Table 2.3 illustrates this point with an example of a worker during six consecutive
spells (in order to include different first two spells of unemployment). The first row
display the labour market status of a worker in reality. This worker has a spell of
employment followed by a spell of unemployment without benefits and then followed
by two sets of employment-unemployment (with benefits) spells. The second row
displays the labour market status of a worker according to the administrative data.
The data and reality coincide except for the second spell which is blank in the data.
Table 2.3: Spell Number Correction
Example. STU expansion
spell 1 spell 2 spell 3 spell 4 spell 5 spell 6
Reality: E U no UI E U w/UI E U w/UI
Data: E blank E Registered U E Registered U
Raw Data: E “E” E Registered U (spell #1) E Registered U (spell #2)
STU expansion: E U (spell #1) E Registered U (spell #2) E Registered U
Notes: U stands for unemployed, UI for unemployment insurance, JtoJ for job-to-job
transitions and E for employed.
The third row in the table shows what would happen if we were to work with
the raw data, that is if the data was not augmented. The first two spells of un-
employment that would be identified would be spells number 4 and 5. This means
that implicitly that we would be assuming that the second spell is an employment
spell (thus labeling it “E”). Instead, as shown in the fourth row of this table, if we
augment the data explained in subsection 2.3.3, we would be replacing the blank
with an unemployment spell (note in this case we have assumed this is the reality
as per the first row). This would imply that the first two spells of unemployment
would now be spells 2 and 4 rather than spells 4 and 6.
This example has meaningful economic content. The case described corresponds
to employment spells of quite short duration with no right of unemployment insur-
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ance. In Spain these correspond to spells out of temporary contracts which are very
predominant (35% of the workforce is on temporary contracts). This means that we
can somehow approximate what is the effect of temporary contracts in Spain to the
question at hand. Using the raw data without the STU expansion approximates the
lack of temporary contracts in the economy to some degree and indeed employment
would appear as more stable than it actually is (i.e., some unemployment spells
would implicitly be considered as employment in the context of this chapter).
2.3.5 Austria and Spain
In the results section we will be comparing Austria and Spain. To this end, it is worth
drawing attention to the key labour market differences between these two countries.
































































Notes: Data from OECD (2017)
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Figure 2.5 shows the unemployment and long-term unemployment4 rates for both
countries since 1990 (1994 in the case of Austria). The first thing to note is that Spain
has substantially higher unemployment than Austria, and its volatility is higher as
well. While for Austria unemployment has stayed between 4 and 5%, in Spain un-
employment fluctuates between 8% in 2007 and 26% in 2013. The right panel also
shows that the share of long-term unemployment is more volatile in Spain, going from
over 50% in 1990 to under 20% in 2007. Long-term unemployment is more relevant
in Spain, but in the 1995-2008 period it decreased considerably, partly due to the
widespread adoption of temporary contracts (see Güell and Hu (2006)). Austria’s
long term unemployment is one of the lowest of the European Union, with similar
levels to Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden. It’s share over total unemployment is
also fluctuating between 20% and 30%. Business cycles are clearly marked in Spain,
while in Austria fluctuations are small and close to a trend.
Unemployment insurance is also different in both countries. Table 2.4 compares
minimum requirements to claim (in the form of previous contribution to the social
security), generosity as measured by the replacement rate (percentage of previous
wages) and maximum duration of entitlement. Overall, Austria has a less generous
system, with a constant replacement rate of 55% of average net wages over the pre-
vious year, while Spain has very generous short-term benefits (70% over the average
net wage over the last 3 months), but lower after 3 months. The main difference
comes with time of entitlement duration: in Spain is proportional to contribution
period (a month for every 3 months of employment) and up to two years, while in
Austria, for those younger than 40 years of age it’s only 6 months. Workers older
than 40 and 50 years of age with enough contribution periods can be granted up to
a year.
In both countries workers have to report to the employment office and regularly
4The OECD defines long-term unemployment as ‘people who have been unemployed for 12
months or more’.
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Table 2.4: Structure of Unemployment Insurance
Austria Spain
Minimum contribution period 12 months in 2 years5 12 months in 6 years
Replacement rate 55% 70% in the first 3 months, 50% after
Maximum duration 1 year6 2 years7
Notes: Data from the European Commission
meet an employment advisor to check they are actively looking for employment and
show that they have not declined any suitable job offer. In the case of expiration
of unemployment insurance, both countries offer unemployment assistance benefits
for those whose who run out of unemployment insurance. In Austria, these can last
up to a year or indefinitely if certain conditions are met. In Spain, it can last up to
11 months or up to 18 months if the individual has family responsibilities or if she’s
older than 55. In both cases the amount of benefits is a share of the minimum living
income calculated by both countries and independent of previous earnings.
2.4 Results
In this section we explain our results. Before that, we need to check a necessary
requirement to implement the Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014) method. As
explained, the method uses the first two spells of unemployment observed for each
individual. The requirement is that these two spells are not too different. This means
that the distribution from which the first spells are drawn is not too different from
the distribution from which the second spells are drawn. We check this empirically
in our data as in Alvarez, Borovičková, and Shimer (2014).
Figure 2.1 displays the hazard rate of the first spells (blue line) as well as of the
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second spells (purple line).
Figure 2.1: Hazard Rate By Number Of Spell
The left hand side figure displays the hazard rates of the first and second spells
using the raw data. As it can be seen, the two spells are very similar. As discussed
before, there are some pronounced spikes that correspond to unemployment benefit
expiration. The middle and right hand side figures display again the hazard rates
of the first and second spells using the data that has been expanded with the LTU
expansion (middle) and the data that has been expanded with the LTU and STU
expansions explained in the previous section. We find the same, that is, the two
spells are very similar. It can be seen in the last two graphs that the expansions of
the data make the spikes smoother.
In the next subsections, we proceed to report the variance decomposition of
unemployment duration (in logs) with the raw data as well as with the different
expansions of the data in order to highlight the importance of such data expan-
sions. As will be seen, results are sensitive to such expansions so it is crucial to
undertake them. As explained in section 2.2 we will distinguish between three dif-
ferent components of the variance of unemployment durations across individuals.
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These three components are: heterogeneity (variation across individuals), duration
dependence (variation within individuals due to different elapsed durations) and the
“constant” component consistent with homogeneous workers and no duration effects.
2.4.1 Variance decomposition with raw data and LTU ex-
pansion
We start decomposing the variance of unemployment duration with the raw Spanish
data. Figure 2.2 displays the results in the left hand side figure. For comparison we
also display the equivalent results for the raw Austrian data in the right hand side
figure. The detailed figures can be found in Table B.1 in Appendix B.
Figure 2.2: Decomposition with LTU addition
Notes: Unemployment duration in logs. Results for Austria taken from Alvarez,
Borovičková, and Shimer (2014). DD stands for duration dependence, HT stands for
heterogeneity.
There are several aspects to highlight. First, the broad decomposition in Spain
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and in Austria is surprisingly similar. For both countries, the component that stands
out is the “constant” component. Secondly, for both countries the “duration depen-
dence” component is actually a negative number. This is an artifact of the untreated
data. That is, the raw data display unemployment spells that are too short as they
only capture unemployment while receiving benefits. This underestimation of un-
employment duration appears as if exit sharply increases around benefit expiration.
This effect is strong enough to generates a positive effect on exit and is present both in
Spain and Austria, but is more pronounced in Spain due to the different functioning
of the two labour markets as explain in section 2.3.5. The longer unemployment ben-
efits and longer unemployment durations as explained in Spain compared to Austria
can reconcile this finding. As explained above this shortcoming of the administrative
data can be addressed with the LTU expansion. Indeed, the middle figure shows the
decomposition once the data have been augmented in this way. As can be seen, the
anomaly of the “duration dependence” component is reduced (becoming a higher
number, even if still a negative number). And the shares of the within component
get redistributed, while as one would expect, the heterogeneity component remains
unaffected. Finally, the share of the variance explained by heterogeneity is rather
small compared to the constant component. And, again, this is a common feature
in both countries.
2.4.2 Variance decomposition with all expansions
We now decompose the variance of unemployment duration with the Spanish data
fully expanded. We also add the case where we count all non-employment spells as
ABS do for Austria. Figure 2.3 displays the results. More detailed results can be
found in Table B.2 in Appendix B. The first left hand side figure presents the de-
composition for Spain counting all non-employment gaps (‘Spain - NE’). The second
figure presents the results for the the LTU and STU expansions (‘Spain - STU’).
The third figure also takes into account the correct spell number that follows the
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STU expansion as explained in section2.3.4 (‘Spain - Spell Corr.’). The last figure
presents the results for Non-Employment spells in Austria.
Figure 2.3: Decomposition with LTU and STU additions
Notes: Unemployment duration in logs. Results for Austria taken from Alvarez,
Borovičková, and Shimer (2014). DD stands for duration dependence, HT stands for
heterogeneity.
Figures 1 and 4 are roughly similar. They are both however very different to Fig-
ure 2.3 in the previous section. The main difference is that the duration dependence
component is now a positive number, as one would expect. The STU expansion
has made the difference in this respect. This is because the raw data display a
hump-shape at very short durations. That is, exit from unemployment is increasing
with duration for very short durations but this disappears when the data have all
expansions (see Figure 2.1). The STU addition incorporates more short spells into
the data, and so does the Non-Employment case as it is a less restricted STU correc-
tion. Still, the main result is that the main component is the constant component,
while heterogeneity and duration dependence are relatively similar. Again, the two
countries are very similar in terms of the decomposition of non-employment dura-
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tion. By adding only the cases of workers who have no right to claim unemployment
benefits, the STU expansion allows us to refer to it as unemployment rather than
non-employment as in the case of Austria. The STU addition is different from all
Non-Employment in that the constant component gains relevance at the expense of
both duration dependence and heterogeneity (each losing about 5 percentage points).
However the ranking and size of heterogeneity and duration dependence is the same.
This is not true when considering the Spell Correction.
This is a very interesting result. As explained before, if we do not correct for
the spell number it is as if we were somehow suppressing the impact of temporary
contracts in the Spanish labour market. Note that in the STU expansion (second
and fourth figures), Spain and Austria have the same ranking (constant > hetero-
geneity > duration dependence), with duration dependence and heterogeneity being
roughly similar. Instead, once we correct for the spell number (i.e. and the impact
of temporary contracts is present through short unemployment spells), then Spain
and Austria become less similar, and duration dependence in Spain gains relevance.
This is consistent with Güell and Hu (2006) that find that temporary contracts in
Spain increase duration dependence.
2.4.3 Business cycle comparisons
An important aspect of the Spanish data and labour market is that we can compare
unemployment between different moments of the business cycle, which display large
variation in unemployment rates as well as unemployment durations. The question
is, is the decomposition of the unemployment duration very different along the busi-
ness cycle? Figure 2.4 displays the decomposition for years 2002-2007 and 2008-2013
(left hand side and right hand side figures, respectively). The former years were
years of lower unemployment and share of long-term unemployment (around 10%
and 30%, respectively), while the latter are years of higher unemployment (around
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25% and 40%, respectively).
Figure 2.4: Spain along business cycle
Notes: Unemployment duration in logs, Spain, fully expanded data.
DD stands for duration dependence, HT stands for heterogeneity.
As can be seen the importance of the three different components is surprisingly
similar in the two very different periods considered. Table B.3 in Appendix B dis-
plays the numerical results. As before, the constant component is clearly the most
important, followed in similar weights by the heterogeneity and duration dependence
components. It is worth mentioning that here we have not distinguish between ob-
served and unobserved heterogeneity as traditional models estimating duration mod-
els do (see for example Lancaster (1979) and Bover, Arellano, and Bentolila (2002)).
It is possible that if we did that, the importance of unobserved heterogeneity would
be different along the business cycle. But it is likely that the comparison with respect
to the constant and the duration dependence components remains unchanged and
similar along the business cycle.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have applied the method recently developed by Alvarez, Borovičková,
and Shimer (2014) to Spain using the administrative social security data described
in Chapter 1. The contribution of this chapter is methodological as well as being
economically relevant.
Methodologically, as explained, administrative data have several advantages,
namely, in this case, precise spell information as opposed to self-reported duration
from survey data. However, administrative data need to be expanded in order to
use them for research. The different expansions needed are country-specific. The
complexity of the Spanish labour market is such that both short and long unem-
ployment durations coexist and we hope that by addressing these data challenges for
the Spanish case this will provide general enough guidance to be useful for applying
this method to other countries Specifically, workers who remain in unemployment
after their benefits expire will have durations that are too short in the administra-
tive data. At the other extreme, workers without benefit entitlement who experience
short unemployment durations will be lacking a recorded unemployment spell. This
is relevant because, as explained, the results of the method proposed by ABS are
sensitive to the data expansions.
From an economic point of view, we have compared two very different countries
(Austria and Spain) as well as Spain along the business cycle. The different data
expansions are also related to underlying functioning of the labour market. In par-
ticular, we have seen how the STU expansion relates to the presence of temporary
contracts in Spain. This allows us to approximate how these contracts may relate
to the decomposition of unemployment duration. In a nutshell, we find that the
decomposition of unemployment duration is very similar both between countries (es-
pecially when minimizing the incidence of temporary contracts) as well as along the
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business cycle within Spain. This may be an unintuitive result at first. But upon
reflection these results could be rationalized by a model of the labour market in
which the overall level of unemployment and unemployment duration do not affect
the importance of the different components of unemployment duration. We leave




Alvarez, F., K. Borovičková, and R. Shimer (2014). Decomposing duration depen-
dence in the job finding rate in a stopping time model. Mimeo University of
Chicago.
Bover, O., M. Arellano, and S. Bentolila (2002). Unemployment duration, benefit
duration and the business cycle. The Economic Journal 112 (479), 223–265.
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Search capital and Unemployment
Duration
3.1 Introduction
Most classical explanations of long term unemployment (LTU thereafter) relate
mostly to older workers, whether is by depreciation of their human capital due to
an exogenous shock, as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008), or because they are bet-
ter insured (unemployment benefits, own savings) against unemployment. However,
these explanations don’t apply so well to younger workers, which have low tenures
(and thus have lower benefits) and have not yet accumulated much human capital.
In the last recession the young have been hit harder by long term unemployment, as
figures 3.1 and 3.2 shows for different European countries. This chapter introduces
a novel mechanism that can help explain these patterns by treating job finding as a
skill that is learned and forgotten over time. This skill is separate from traditional
human capital because it is unrelated to workers productivity on the job, but it
accumulates process. I refer to this skill as search capital.
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In particular, I characterise this skill as the one that make workers searching for
employment more successful by finding jobs faster. Workers with high search capital
receive more offers in any given period and thus have a wider choice of jobs, making
them more likely to find a better job, faster. Because of this they will be less likely
to remain unemployed for long periods of time. Workers’ search capital increases
by successfully finding a job, in the sense that workers use their previous experience
(the places they applied to, the way they pass the different stages of recruitment
processes) to search more efficiently next time they face unemployment. While some
of these skills can be learnt after a failed application workers are likely to learn more
through successful search. However search capital deteriorates if it is not used, as
recent experiences are more relevant than those in the distant past. This implies
that proficient searchers are the ones that have had more recent exposure to search,
while new entrants to the job market and workers with long tenures are going to be
relatively worse at finding jobs.
In this chapter I will be focusing on the case of Spain, the country in figures 3.1
and 3.2 where the increase in youth LTU has been more pronounced after Greece.
The dual labour market structure that characterises Spain generates substantial
heterogeneity in labour market experiences among the unemployed, which can be
used to identify search capital. Workers in temporary contracts, which rarely ends
in promotion to regular contracts, are forced to constantly search for employment.
Workers with permanent contracts enjoy longer job tenures and rarely experience un-
employment and thus do not accumulate search capital. Using administrative data
for Spain, I find a negative correlation between the number of temporary jobs and
unemployment duration, which I use as proxy for search capital. I also test whether
workers with more temporary contracts in the past find worse jobs in the future by
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Figure 3.1: Youth and overall long term unemployment



































































Figure 3.2: Youth and overall long term unemployment, annual log change





































































looking at wages and duration of the next job. I find a small but positive effect on
wages, and a positive effect on duration after controlling for individual fixed effects.
This provides some evidence at the individual level to support the search capital
channel.
I then propose a dynamic search model to quantify the effect that search capi-
tal differences have on aggregate outcomes. In particular, I focus on the differences
in job finding rates and unemployment duration among different age groups. The
model generates life-cycle dynamics that closely match the data. The addition of
search capital helps explain the labour market flows of young workers and generates
substantial differences in unemployment durations among workers of the same age
group. Over time, workers become worse at searching as they settle into stable jobs,
their search skills deteriorating as a result. This could potentially pose a problem if
these workers where to lose their jobs, as an inflow of inefficient searchers can result
in more long term unemployment.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 explains search capital
in more depth and compares it to other mechanisms in the literature that may have
similar effects; Section 3.3 provides empirical evidence at the individual level; Section
3.4 presents a theoretical search model that incorporates search capital and calibrates
it for Spain; Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Search Capital and Long Term Unemployment
This section explains more extensively what I refer to as search capital and how
it relates to long term unemployment (LTU thereafter). For this the interactions
with a dual labour market are very relevant, so this section also argues that the
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case of Spain is relevant to test the effects of search capital. It then identifies and
reviews the main competing mechanisms that could drive an increase in long term
unemployment and have similar effects to those that would be explained by search
capital.
3.2.1 Search Capital, Dual Labour Markets and LTU
Earlier I defined search capital as the set of skills that help workers find jobs. For
example, knowing the places they should applied to (applying for the right kind of
jobs for the productive skills workers have, diversifying their search, etc) or knowing
how to prepare for the different stages of recruitment processes (interviews, tests,
etc). While some of these skills can be learnt after a failed application (a disastrous
interview can help improve next one) workers are likely to learn more through suc-
cessful search - which means they can use their previous experience should they need
to find a job again. Being a more efficient searcher translates into being able to apply
to more jobs and increases the chances of being offered the job after the application
process. That is the approach I follow in the theoretical model of Section 3.4.
This treatment has some advantages: first, it makes a mapping between an unob-
servable variable (search capital) and an observable outcome: number of successful
job searches or jobs held by the worker. Second, it makes search capital dynamics
easier to incorporate to model, while modelling as a learning process through fail
applications as well can become more complicated and potentially imply that search
skills increase with time in unemployment. It is a well known result that long term
unemployed workers have lower job finding rates (see for example Blanchard and
Landier (2002), Hornstein (2012)) so this is not a desirable feature a priori. Think-
ing of search capital as improving only with success keeps it separate to duration
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dependence and its determinants. This doesn’t rule out that search capital can be
defined in broader terms, allowing for a richer learning process, but narrowing the
definition makes it easier to work with. The correlation between number of jobs held
and search capital would still hold if workers also learnt from their failed or rejected
applications.
The empirical strategy of Section 3.3 relies in this correlation. However how can
we know that people that have had more jobs are less productive, or have different
preferences to other workers? The interaction of search capital with dual labour
markets helps with some of these concerns. For example, in Spain a large share
(30%) of workers are employed under temporary contracts, with finite duration and
low protection in the form of severance payments. The other 70% of the employed
hold permanent contracts, which have increasing wages and severance with tenure,
so these workers little incentive to change jobs after finding permanent employment.
Temporary jobs do not immediately translate into stable employment (see for ex-
ample Güell and Petrongolo (2007); Garćıa-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2011)) but
instead they often lead to other temporary contracts or unemployment. In other Eu-
ropean countries jobs are also unstable for the young, but what sets Spain apart is
that even in their late twenties, temporary jobs are common. A possible explanation
is that high skill workers enter the market particularly late as well, with the average
age of graduation being 27 (OECD (2014)) but engineering, architecture and other
technical degrees the average is over 30. This is mostly due to students finishing
their degrees after an average of 5 years more than the official time. The result is a
growing stock of workers who are frequently searching in the labour market, while
simultaneously the security of permanent jobs builds a stock of workers that are very
unlikely to ever search again.
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Search capital as introduced in this chapter is different from search capital as de-
fined by Carrillo-Tudela and Smith (2017).1 They refer to the ability of the worker
to recall previous employers while employed at another firm, helping them search on
the job, while I am referring to the ability of workers to find jobs from unemployment
in different firms. This is an important distinction in the empirical model: I do not
count recalls back from unemployment as increasing search capital, as the worker
doesn’t necessarily learns anything by being ask to come back to work at the same
firm. Their model is also silent about the implications for unemployment duration,
while here it is a central issue.
The link to Long Term Unemployment
As temporary workers are the ones that find themselves more frequently unemployed,
during economic expansions search capital is fairly homogeneous across workers. The
expansion of 1995-2008 in Spain, together with the job-creation effect of temporary
contracts (Güell and Hu (2006)) meant that long-term unemployment fell for all age
groups as shown in figure 3.3. This implies that the overall search capital of the
unemployed increased during this period. These falling LTU patterns have reversed
since 2009, with some authors arguing that the rapid increase in unemployment (and
the subsequent increase in LTU) is mainly driven by job destruction from temporary
contracts2: Firms tend to prefer to reduce their temporary workforce rather than
1They present search capital as the ability of the worker to recall past employers, so that if
current employment ends the worker can go back to their previous employer instead of “falling off
the ladder” and start again from a very low productivity job. This has implications for the wage
setting process, as firms engage in Bertrand competition to poach workers from other firms. In
their model, search capital can also depreciate so that contacts of the worker in their previous job
may vanish - so some unlucky workers may not have to option to go back to their past firm.
2See for example Bentolila et al. (2012) for a comparison between the impact of the recession
between France and Spain, where the differences are driven by the wider gap between permanent
and temporary contracts in terms of severance payments. Temporary contracts are much easier
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Source: Own calculations from the Spanish Labour Force Survey (INE (2013))
Figure 3.4: Flows into unemployment, by contract type
Source: Own calculations from INE, Encuesta de la población activa (Labour Force Survey), 2013
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adjust wages and as a consequence there is too much firing in recessions. The volatil-
ity of temporary to unemployment flows does seem to play a significant role in the
overall volatility of unemployment (Silva and Vázquez-Grenno (2013)). However the
collapse of the construction sector (58% decline in employment from 2008 to 2013),
and later a severe financial crisis translated into an increase in lay-offs from both
kind of contracts3, as figure 3.4 shows. The left panel presents the evolution of flows
into unemployment from temporary (blue, left scale) and permanent (green,right
scale) contracts. As the difference in scaling shows, separation rates from permanent
contracts are about ten times smaller than those of temporary workers. However,
the spike of 2008 is higher for permanent contracts (from 0.008 in 2007 to 0.023 in
late 2008). The right panel of this figure shows the log difference of these series (log
of the flow at time t+ 1 - log of the flow at time t), where the magnitude of changes
in 2008 is again very similar, so in relative terms the increase in job destruction
rates from both types of contract was similar. Costain et al. (2010) explained these
patterns in their paper as follows: falling productivity thresholds in booms leads
to more conversions from temporary to permanent, this creates a growing stock of
low productivity permanent workers that are dismissed in a recession.4 The main
driving factor behind the increase in unemployment is not temporary contracts, but
high severance payments that prevent firing unproductive permanent workers.
to destroy in Spain in their model, so firms react to a fall in productivity by firing most of their
temporary workforce.
3In fact, following the sovereign debt crisis triggered by these events and the Greece fallout, the
government dismissed a significant number of their employees as well. More specifically, real estate
lost 22% of its employment, financial services 11%, and 1.7% in the public sector in the 2005-2008
period, according to employment statistics from the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE
(2017)). In 2011 alone, the public sector lost 175,000 workers.
4In their model some workers start with high match productivity and thus are promoted to a
permanent contract. But stochastic productivity shocks can effectively make them less productive
than the hiring threshold. They are kept employed because firing the worker forces firms to pay a
lump-sum tax, which for some workers is high enough to keep them in. This is the risk that firms
incur when promoting workers, and thus they are more likely going to promote during a period of
economic boom.
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How does this relate to search capital? Permanent workers have lower levels of
search capital because they have been employed longer on average in the same firm,
with few incentives to search.5 When recessions destroy “safe” jobs, there is an in-
flux of bad searchers into the unemployment pool. At the same time, there is more
competition for fewer vacancies, so frequent searchers take these jobs first. As these
jobs are also predominantly temporary contracts, they flow back into unemployment
after not too long, and then again find another job with relative ease. This mech-
anism depresses the chances of finding jobs for both new entrants with little search
experience and dismissed permanent workers. The combination of the market-driven
heterogeneity in search abilities of the workforce with a severe recession makes Spain
a good choice to test the effects of search capital6
However there are other explanations in the literature that can account for the
rise in long term unemployment in Spain, although not necessarily for the youth. I
highlight the main two competing theories next.
3.2.2 Related explanations of LTU
Unemployment Benefits
It is a well known theoretical result that a higher unemployment income results in
higher unemployment in almost every search model. Consider for example Mortensen
5For example a worker in the public sector in Spain has to pass an examination process that is
very different from private sector application process. In addition to this, public servants have very
protected jobs.
6It is worth noting though that Spain is not an isolated case and that other Southern European
countries with segmented labour markets, such as Italy and Portugal, also saw an increase in their
long term unemployment rates. The relatively minor effects in France can be attributed to their
milder recession: Search capital increases unemployment when general unemployment is high and
there is an influx of bad searchers in the unemployment pool.
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(1970): a worker draws a wage offer from a given distribution, then she decides
whether to accept the job or to reject the offer and keep searching. The worker sets
a reservation wage strategy which depends positively on their unemployment income.
She internalizes that she is going to be unemployed for longer in return for a higher
future wage. Being richer makes the worker more selective. This is a mechanism
that drives more sophisticated models such as Kitao et al. (2017).
The empirical literature seems to confirm these patterns: Lalive (2007), and
Krueger and Mueller (2010) find longer periods of unemployment benefits (UB here-
after) results in longer spells of unemployment. Krueger and Mueller (2010) find that
time devoted to search increases as the date of benefit exhaustion approaches, but
then it is reduced drastically. This implies that although longer UB entitlements can
lead to longer unemployment spells they appear to keep the unemployed searching
for work. Wadsworth (1991) similarly finds that UB recipients are more attached to
the labour market. It seems to be the case in the literature that entitlement (how
long benefits last) is more important than the quantity of benefits. This also appears
to be consistent with the fact that Northern European countries, where workers are
given their benefits in a block payment, have lower unemployment durations overall.
An overly generous benefit can thus lead to longer unemployment durations as
an equilibrium outcome. Because the quantity and duration of unemployment ben-
efits are usually dependent on past wages and job durations workers coming from
longer durations are expected to take longer to find jobs. The increase in long term
unemployment rates could be explained by high-income/wealthy workers choosing
to wait for a better job.
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In Spain, regular workers tend to have, on average, better paid jobs than tem-
porary workers (because of seniority wage rules and better unionisation) but also
because if they are laid off they receive severance payments that, in some cases,
can be quite substantial. As more permanent workers have been dismissed in the
recession, the composition of the unemployment pool has shifted towards richer in-
dividuals.
The generosity of benefits in Spain is high but in line with other European coun-
tries. For example, Stovicek et al. (2012) do a detailed comparative study of un-
employment insurance and benefits across EU countries and Spain does not stand
out in any dimension. While replacement rates are on the high end (approximately
70% on average7) the lack of other social benefits, such as housing assistance, child
supplements or minimum income, means that Spain is not a particularly generous
country for unemployed workers. The maximum extension of UB is two years, similar
to France, Portugal or the Netherlands. The median unemployment compensation
is 636.22 euros a month compared to the median wage of 1351.72 for temporary
workers and 1446.75 for permanent workers.8 In response to the rapid increase of
LTU, Spain did not extend entitlement periods as many US states opted to do. Ex-
haustion of benefits became commonplace during the recession with close to 50% of
all unemployed not receiving any benefits as of 2012.9 It is hard to argue that the
rise in LTU is driven by workers preferring to remain unemployed for a period of
time beyond the exhaustion of their benefits.
7Stovicek et al. (2012)
8These are based on calculations using the information in the tax data of the Social Security
Working Lives Sample, once the bottom and top 1% percentiles have been removed. See Data
section for a detailed account of how these were calculated.
9Based on the Spanish LFS and matching Administrative data.
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While the generosity of unemployment benefits is a good explanation for the in-
crease in LTU in general, it is not a good explanation for the increase in youth LTU
as their lower wages and shorter tenures imply that many of them are not receiving
unemployment benefits - and where they are, these are modest and only for a short
period.
Human Capital Depreciation
A popular explanation of long term unemployment increases during a recession is
that technology shocks can produce redundancies that lead to an immediate and
persistent deterioration of productive human capital. This makes it harder for those
affected to find subsequent employment. Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) called this
turbulence.
In a more recent paper, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008) present a model in which,
upon losing their job, some workers suffer a sudden and permanent loss of human
capital. This leads to lower expected future wages and search effort. Combined with
a generous unemployment benefit, individuals who suffer these human capital shocks
are discouraged from searching for a new job, leading to long term unemployment.
In a similar way, Carrillo-Tudela and Visschers (2013) look at mismatch across occu-
pations and find that most unemployment generated during recessions is what they
call “resting” unemployment - workers looking for a job in their previous occupation
instead of switching careers. These workers prefer to wait in unemployment in their
occupation-specific job market during a recession, in the hopes that their human
capital doesn’t fully deteriorate, leading to longer durations of unemployment.
This sudden loss of human capital, it can be argued, is driven by idiosyncratic
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shocks to labour demand. For example, in Spain the collapse of the construction sec-
tor left many workers unemployed and with a set of skills which is no longer desired
by firms. Related industries like building material providers, real estate and financial
services also suffer major job losses. More importantly the budget readjustment of
2011 meant a considerable shrinkage of public sector employment.
In this case, the end of a long term job sees part of the human capital of the
worker vanish, leading to subsequent job losses. This has been well documented in
the displaced worker literature (see Jacobson et al. (1993) and Couch and Placzek
(2010) for updated results). If the worker is also entitled to high unemployment
benefits then she may be discouraged to search. This mechanism can’t fully explain
how more experience of temporary contracts (or recent unemployment spells) lead to
shorter durations unless temporary contracts increase a worker’s human capital more
so than a stable contract. However Dolado et al. (2012) have argued that there is
no incentive to invest in human capital for temporary workers, documenting a lower
incidence of on-the-job training provided by firms compared to permanent workers.
In this way permanent contracts could incentivise firm-specific human capital in-
vestment while temporary contracts improve transferable skills, leading to observed
shorter unemployment spells for those with temporary contracts. Lazear (2009) pro-
poses a model where workers choose to specialise in different kinds of skills depending
on how likely an exogenous lay-off can happen, this leads to diversification of human
capital in those industries/occupations where jobs are more unstable.
Crucially, the depreciation of human capital can’t explain why long term unem-
ployment has risen so dramatically among young workers. Kitao et al. (2017) argue
that higher minimum wages are to blame, but then why are some young workers
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finding jobs much faster than others? The proliferation of temporary contracts and
apprenticeships does not imply that minimum wages are too high, but shows that
minimum wages are easily circumvented.
A related issue is the depreciation of human capital during unemployment. This
could induce negative duration dependence - lower exit rates the longer a worker is
unemployed. Note that search capital does not decrease with unemployment dura-
tion, as workers do not lose any of their search skills while using them to pursue
jobs. Therefore this explanation does not compete with search capital.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
Search capital is not observable. Ideally one would like to measure search skills
like networks or application strategy. However we may be able to identify skilled
searchers by looking at their search outcomes: those who find better jobs faster,
once controlling for all other observables, are likely to have better search skills. But
these skills could be an inherent trait of the individuals, some people may be born
with a natural advantage over others when it comes to finding jobs, having well-
connected family or friends for example. This doesn’t mean however that people
don’t get better at searching with time. In order to try to investigate this one would
need panel data, with enough variation across time and individuals to see if workers
do get progressively better at searching. Working histories datasets, provided by
certain social security administrations, are fit for this purpose.
3.3.1 The Data
The Spanish Social Security administration provides this information from 2004, re-
leasing a sample of close to a million random observations each year. This is is the
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Muestra cont́ınua de Vidas Laborales (MCVL) analysed in Chapter 1. The data
follows individuals through time, adding new observations for the ones dropping
out (workers retiring or dying) keeping the sample representative from year to year.
Specifically, it consists of a sample of 4% of the working population. The condition
to be included in the sample is to have been affiliated with Social Security (either by
working, receiving a public pension or being registered as unemployed) in the year of
the publication of the dataset. After that year, the MCVL follows the same sample
of workers over time, adding new observations each year to replace absences while
keeping the sample representative of the population. The MCVL comprises all of
the job spells, unemployment spells and retirement periods that are registered by
the administration for each individual in the sample. It contains information on per-
sonal characteristics (age, gender, date of birth, highest education attained) from the
census (last wave dating to 2011), some firm information (size, location, tax code)
and information on the job such as industry, occupational scale and type of contract.
It keeps track of changes of contract and changes in relation to social security (for
example from unemployed to retirement). The MCVL also has information on the
self-employed.
The Spanish Social Security also provides a complementary dataset with income
tax information, which can be linked to the working histories files via fiscal identi-
fiers. This way it is possible to obtain detailed wage information for most jobs in
the sample. It also holds records on severance payments, food coupons, dividends
and any other form of transfer between the firm and the worker as payment for
work services.10 Unemployment subsidies received in the last year are also recorded,
10There is an alternative way of matching jobs with wages though the contribution basis file.
Contribution basis are the basic salary threshold that the Social Security uses to calculate contri-
butions to the system. In a recent paper Bonhomme and Hospido (2017) use this data to analyse
earnings. I use the tax information because it captures overpay and payments in kind, which
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making it possible to approximate the amount of unemployment benefits received in
the unemployment spells of the previous year. If the worker has several unemploy-
ment episodes in the year for which she received unemployment compensation it is
not possible to separate them. However, these occurrences are rare as most unem-
ployed workers can’t accumulate enough working spells to be eligible within the year.
I use the 2005-2013 waves of the MCVL. The data contains past information and
it would be tempting to use it to go back in time and approximate the workforce of
previous years. However, as we go back into the past, the sample stops being repre-
sentative as it turns younger and only those active in the present are represented in
the past.
One concern that arises when using administrative data to study unemployment
is that administrations only count registered unemployment spells. For those who
can’t or choose not to claim UB, the sample only has gaps. However with minor
adjustments (using official definitions and labour laws) it is possible to reconstruct
the unemployment series to be close to those coming from the Labour Force Survey:
figure 1.7 in Chapter 1 showed that without any modifications, the Social Security
quarterly unemployment rate is well below the LFS. Adding (1) the days in between
finished jobs (2) uncompleted spells as of 2013 and (3) gaps between employment
spells for those without the right to claim UB generates the ‘MCVL expanded’ se-
ries11, which closely follows the LFS except from the 2005-2008 period. Here the
difference is likely coming from the failure of the LFS to adequately capture short
unemployment spells for young workers (see Chapter 1). The expansion of the MCVL
have increased since the onset of the recession. These kind of payments are more common among
temporary and part-time workers.
11In practice, there are more restrictions on which gaps between employment spells are added,
such as excluding recalls to the same firm. See Chapter 1 for more details.
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ensures that spurious spikes in duration at the termination of benefits are ruled out.
These can have important effects in the estimation of duration models, as noted in
Chapter 2 and Alvarez et al. (2015). There is also an issue around how the LFS
classifies unemployment and non-participation, as the flows to employment for both
groups are very similar for young workers. This suggests that the unemployment
data from the LFS is very sensitive to the definition of unemployment, and thus
that in Spain there is little evidence of the non-participants of working age to being
completely detached from the labour market. In fact it is well documented that pre-
vious changes in this definition caused important breaks in the series. The MCVL
is helpful for dealing with these breaks in the LFS data.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
count mean std min 25% 50% 75% max
Weeks 703,061 31.66 42.01 2 6.57 16.29 38.71 462.86
Temporary contracts 703,061 6.29 6.29 0 2 5 8 251
Permanent contracts 703,061 3.79 5.72 0 0 2 5 232
waget−1 (euros, annual) 703,061 19879.72 331783.65 0.01 10334.04 15139.48 19817.51 256319430.50
waget+1 (euros, annual) 602,510 14610.17 63325.83 0.03 4016.85 12578.33 18066.59 28970452.81
UBt (euros, annual) 694,728 6440.86 11417.19 0 2482.65 5414.58 9086.54 2315531.94
Tenure (years) 703,061 0.97 2.19 0 0.08 0.27 0.82 39.27
Experience (PC, years) 703,061 4.19 5.78 0 0 1.69 6.18 39.48
Experience (TC, years) 703,061 2.42 2.23 0 0.63 1.87 3.59 24.59
UB entitlement (months) 703,061 4.31 7.28 0 0 0 6 24.33
Age 703,061 32.75 8.90 20 25 31 39 54
Male dummy 703,061 0.56 0.50 0 0 1 1 1
Quit dummy 703,061 0.16 0.37 0 0 0 0 1
Source: MCVL, 2005-2013 waves. The sample is all completed unemployment spells, ending in
employment, with wage information for the next job, recalls and transitions from self-employment
excluded. Wages and unemployment benefits are taken from the fiscal annex of the MCVL (2005-
2013).
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Table 3.2: Variables of interest
Effect Control variable Variable name
Unemployment benefits (quantity) Observed daily benefits UB
Unemployment benefits (duration) Claim dummies for 3,6,12,18,24 months claim3, claim6, ...
Severance Payments Indicator for last permanent contract Last P, tenure
Quality of previous matching Observed past daily wages log(past wage)
Quality of future matching Observed future daily wages log(wage)
Human Capital (general) Work experience over potential experience R. Experience
Human Capital (specific) Tenure in the last job Tenure
Search Capital (gain) Number of temporary contracts held No. T
Search Capital (atrophy) Years since last unemployment spell YEmp
3.3.2 Identification Strategy
The goal of the empirical model is to test for a relationship between past and present
search outcomes, or how workers with different working histories but similar in all
other ways can have different unemployment spells. In particular, do people who
have found different jobs in the past have shorter unemployment spells than others
with fewer jobs in the past? And if so, are the jobs they find better on average?
My main identification strategy is to use the number of temporary contracts held
in the past as a proxy for search capital. There are several reasons for using this
approach: first, it can be interpreted as the number of previous successes the worker
has had finding a job with different firms. This is important because it is not search-
ing per se that is of interest, but successful search. They indicate that the worker has
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had experience of search in the past and that she was good enough to obtain a job.
Having worked in different firms also signals adaptability and it can be thought of
as an indicator of transferable skills. This is what makes temporary jobs a better in-
dication of search capital than permanent jobs, which usually imply that the worker
won’t search for a job for a long time. There are some caveats: the firm may “recall”
the worker after they have been unemployed for some time, making unemployment
an agreed holiday. This is especially true for very frequent jobs, sometimes lasting
a day at a time. Using fiscal firm identifiers I exclude recalls and count temporary
contract roll-outs (two or more temporary jobs in a row by the same firm) as only one
job. This is to ensure there was search involved in the process of finding the next job.
An alternative measure can be the number of past unemployment spells. How-
ever, this would rule out search on the job. As I am aiming at capturing how up
to date the worker is, these transitions can’t be ignored. I also add the number
of permanent contracts, but having had a permanent contract in the past can have
negative connotations for future employers: to leave a permanent position the worker
had to quit (low commitment) or the firm had to lay off the worker (low productiv-
ity). Temporary contracts do not have these negative connotations as they just end,
and given the low rate of promotion this does not signal much about the worker.
Some sectors have seasonal demand upswings (e.g. tourism and agriculture) for
which temporary contracts are a natural choice, again having many temporary jobs
in these sectors doesn’t signal anything negative about the worker. I include both
previous temporary and permanent jobs in my regressions, and as expected I find
them to have different effects.
A more interesting question is how to capture search skill depreciation. Using
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time since last unemployment spell is a good proxy, but as argued before it also
means ignoring on-the-job search. Tenure then becomes the best proxy variable, but
using this it would be impossible to untangle how much of the effect is due to loss of
search skills and how much to loss of specific human capital. Temporary contracts
can still capture some of it: consider two workers with the same duration at their
previous job, but where one of them had several temporary contracts before that
job. The difference in unemployment duration will then be attributed to different
search abilities, not to human capital.
Another variable that is closely related to this is unemployment entitlement pe-
riod. It is a well know result that there are spikes in job exiting rates close to the
expiration of benefits (Card et al. (2007)). This is partly a reflection of employ-
ment agencies only recording unemployment while benefits last, as is the case in
Spain. These spikes are closely related to the amount of time since the worker was
last unemployed, which is another reason to treat the time since last unemployment
(Y Emp) variable cautiously. I include dummies for 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months (de-
noted by the vector CLAIM) as these are the most common spikes to control for
unemployment entitlement period.
It is also important to have good control variables for the other factors detailed
in section 2 that could also be related to past working histories but do not relate
to search capital directly: human capital, incentives to search and matching factors.
The most important of these controls is taken from the tax information file: past
wages, unemployment benefits and severance payments. Past wages are related to
productivity, both specific to the individual (more productive workers are likely to
have higher wages on average) and to the match itself.
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I identify worker-firm pairs using their tax codes, ensuring I correctly identify
the previous job. A caveat is that although the tax file only records annual wages,
if the worker has more than one job with the same firm in the same year I assume
the wages are constant among jobs within the year in the same firm. As I am ex-
cluding recalls from the sample, this should not make a significant difference. Some
firm-worker pairs can’t be identified because some firms have special fiscal identifiers
(such as public administrations). The information added by this variable outweighs
the potential concerns about noise and missing information, so it is included in all
regressions.
I also observe the amount of unemployment benefits the worker receives while
unemployed, which is directly related to past wages. As some workers are not enti-
tled to any benefits (quits, self-employed, those who have not accumulated enough
tenure) this variable can be interpreted as the effect of more generous benefits on du-
ration, keeping previous wages constant - and keeping duration of benefits constant
too. The only caveat is that unemployment benefits are recorded annually and do
not distinguish between different unemployment spells. By linking the tax dataset
to the working histories I count the days of unemployment within a year in which
the worker was eligible to receive them and divide the total amount in euros by the
days of unemployment. This measure is likely to be noisy - much more so than wages
- so in some regressions I choose not to include it. In the results it can be seen that
unemployment benefits don’t seem to add much more information that wages and
unemployment entitlement dummies. Figure 3.5 shows the resulting benefits and
wages distribution.
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Figure 3.5: Wage distributions



















Source: Own calculations from MCVL, 2005-2013 waves, fiscal annex
Finally, the tax dataset records severance payments separately from general wages
as they are excluded from income tax computations - giving an incentive to the
worker to report them truthfully. However, the data on severance payments is very
noisy (only identified for 2% of permanent workers and 5% temporary workers).
Given that most permanent jobs end in a dismissal (as opposed to a quit), a dummy
taking the value 1 when the last job was permanent should suffice to control for sev-
erance payments, but I add the declared severance payments in the robustness check.
Other variables of interest are the controls for human capital, simply in the form
of accumulated job experience in years12 and past tenure for non-transferable human
12In alternative specifications I rescale this variable as years of employment over years in the
labour force. The results don’t change substantially but affect the coefficients for age. I choose to
retain age in the regressions, so I revert to use total years of experience.
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capital. The usual controls for age, gender and educational levels (split in 4 levels13)
are included. I also include controls for industry at the one digit-level, province of
residence and a proxy for occupational level.14
3.3.3 Empirical approach
Given the data and the variables, the empirical strategy is to regress the logarithm of
weeks of unemployment against the explanatory variables discussed previously plus
control variables for individual characteristics, as equation 1 shows. These include
age (with a quadratic trend), gender, nationality, industry, region (at the province
level) and occupational level. I also include dummies for part-time, collective dis-
missal and quits. Finally I include two specific dummies for workers coming from
construction jobs: one after and one before 2008, the year of the collapse of the
building sector.
log(weekst) = β0 + β1No.T + β2Y Emp+ γCLAIM + β3LastP + β4Ten+
β5Exp+ β6log(waget−1) + β7log(UBt) + δX + ε (3.1)
The unit of observation is a complete unemployment spell: an unemployment
spell that ends in a job or self-employment. I exclude self-employed that have lost
their job to allow for an easier interpretation of the dummy for last permanent
13Base category being no formal education/finishing at most primary school, secondary education,
pre-university education (including vocational training that requires a secondary education degree)
and university education.
14Practically all formal jobs have their wages determined by collective agreements at the industry
and/or regional levels. There agreements specify different lower bounds for salaries levels within
the firm according to professional categories - manager, engineer/skilled analytical worker, high
and low skill white collar jobs, etc. The combination of industry-professional category can provide
a proxy for occupation, therefore I add these professional categories as controls. Garćıa-Pérez and
Muñoz-Bullón (2011) argue that they provide a more accurate measure of skill requirement for the
job.
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contract. In this way, each individual could be appearing multiple times in the re-
gression, but still the sample will be representative of the unemployment pool: some
workers find themselves more often unemployed while others rarely appear in the
sample. As the aim is to capture the competition of different workers for jobs, the
“one spell, one observation” approach is suitable.
A possible concern is that individuals that appear as unemployed multiple times
have some unobserved characteristic driving them back and forward from unemploy-
ment. Many of these seemingly quick employment/unemployment spells are driven
by recalls: a worker returning to the same firm after a brief period of unemployment.
I have restricted to sample to consider only workers that change firms to avoid re-
calls, so this frequent unemployment spells have to come from workers switching jobs.
Finally, to address possible unobservable heterogeneity, I redo the exercise with in-
dividual fixed effects. Here the interpretation of the coefficients is different: in the
pooled sample, β1 would be the marginal effect of having had one more temporary
contract in the past on log weeks in unemployment (percentage increase in weeks)
across workers. In the fixed effects regressions it would represent the effect of one
additional temporary contract on the difference in duration of unemployment spells
across time for a single worker. That is, if it is positive (negative) then as the worker
accumulates temporary contracts her unemployment spells get longer (shorter) over
time. In this way the panel regression measures the effect of accumulating search
capital over time, while the pooled regressions measure the effects across workers -
some may be born with higher stocks of search capital than others.
The empirical strategy is more simple than in Garćıa-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón
(2011), but the variable of interest is different: here the interest lies in identifying
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systematic differences in completed unemployment spells, while Garćıa-Pérez and
Muñoz-Bullón are concerned with estimating hazard rates for exiting unemployment
- and ultimately whether or not they have an effect on future upgrades to permanent
contracts.
Finally, to complement the analysis above I run a logistic model where I consider
the probability that an unemployment spell will last more than a year (LTU1) and
two (LTU2) against all the previous variables. As the average spell in Spain is close
to a year, I use the two year mark to signal long term unemployment more effec-
tively. The influence of the benefit claiming period (claim12 and claim24) will be
clear here. But more importantly, given the increase in long term unemployment in
Spain during the recession, skilled searchers having even a small advantage in find-
ing a job could protect them from very long unemployment spells during recessions.
These probabilistic regressions consider the impact that one additional success can
have on that outcome (long term unemployment).
Of course, it could be that workers with more temporary contracts happen to
find jobs faster but these jobs are otherwise worse than the rest. I test for this in
two ways: First I regress equation 2 using the information on the next job wages -
excluding those who become self-employed.15 Given that my wage data comes from
annual sources and for some jobs it can be imprecise, I restrict the sample to workers
who find a job that lasts at least 3 months. Unemployment duration is included as
an explanatory variable on its own. This way any remaining effects of all of the
other variables are to be interpreted as their independent effect on wages aside from
its indirect effect on duration. Consider the case where the coefficient of temporary
15Not many do in the sample.
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contracts is negative and significant in both duration and wage regressions. Then
temporary contracts will be correlated with shorter unemployment spells, but also
with lower wages. Its overall effect on wage will depend on how unemployment
duration impacts wages: its effect on duration may be strong enough to have a
positive wage impact overall.
log(waget+1) = β0+β1No.T+β2Y Emp+γCLAIM+β1No.T+β3LastP+β4Ten+
β5R.Exp+ β6log(weekst) + β7log(waget−1) + β8log(UBt) + δX + ε (3.2)
There is also the concern (as discuss earlier in section 3.2) that even if temporary
contracts lead to higher wages, these are compensating for the greater uncertainty of
temporary contracts. Here it is good to remember that over 92% of the unemploy-
ment spells in the sample end in a temporary contract, so the chances of getting a
permanent job out of unemployment are very small. It also makes sense that workers
already employed in a temporary job have more leverage when negotiating the terms
of future employment than the unemployed, so transitions to permanent jobs are
not only promotions within firms but across firms too. Temporary contracts could
reduce the average duration of future jobs or impact the chances of getting promoted
to a permanent contract. To test this hypothesis, I run another regression with two
alternative dependent variables: duration of next job (remember that all spells in
the sample end in a job) and time until next unemployment spell.
log(weekst+1) = β0 + β1No.Tt + β2Y Empt + γCLAIMt + β3LastPt + β4Tent−1+
β5Expt + β6log(weekst) + β7log(waget−1) + β8log(UBt) + δX + ε (3.3)
This last variable takes into account not only the next job, but any subsequent em-
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ployment spell. This measure could be right-censored, especially for 2012-2013 ob-
servations. In the robustness checks I restrict this regression to early unemployment
spells only. Equation 3 also incorporates the length of the current unemployment
spell to control for any impact long durations could have - weaker bargaining posi-
tion, discrimination, etc.
3.3.4 Results
Results are shown in tables 3.3 to 3.6. The first table has six columns: the first
three correspond to a pooled OLS regression (each unemployment spell counts as
one observation) while the others are fixed effects panel regressions. The difference
among them is the addition of past wage and present UB variables. This is because
not all observations have wage information from their previous job, as noted before.
This is the reason why the number of observations of columns 2-3 and 5-6 is smaller.
Duration of unemployment
The first thing to note is that the number of temporary contracts held in the past
(No.T ) is significant and negative, even when controlling for individual fixed ef-
fects. Each temporary contract reduces the unemployment spell by 3% on average,
with slightly higher effects (3.2%) once controlling for past wages (column 2) and
unemployment benefits (column 3). Recall that the average number of temporary
contracts is 4, so the effect of exposure to temporary contracts for the average worker
is 12%. The magnitude of the effect is reduced in the fixed effects regressions. A
possible interpretation of this is that this is the effect for each worker throughout
their working life, whereas the effect on pooled regressions is the effect between dif-
ferent workers. An alternative explanation is that the effect of temporary contracts
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Table 3.3: Regressions on Unemployment Duration
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks)
No. T -0.030∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
YEmp 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013)
3 months claim 0.154∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0057)
6 months claim 0.148∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0064) (0.0075) (0.0075)
12 months claim 0.109∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(0.0083) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0110) (0.0126) (0.0127)
18 months claim 0.078∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0171) (0.0195) (0.0196)
24 months claim 0.011 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0236) (0.0270) (0.0272)
Last P 0.111∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Tenure 0.011∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Experience -0.010∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0034)
No. P -0.038∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032)
age -0.013∗∗∗ -0.002 -0.001 -0.038∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.0054)
log(past wage) -0.081∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0018)
log(UI) -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 1.074∗∗∗ 1.203∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗ 0.993∗ 0.971∗
(0.1547) (0.2370) (0.2387) (0.3275) (0.4014) (0.4024)
Controls
Years 3 3 3 3 3 3
Industry 3 3 3 3 3 3
Occupation 3 3 3 3 3 3
Region 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 587,222 465,832 461,369 587,222 465,832 461,369
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.559 0.561 0.462 0.457 0.458
AIC 1,502,926 1,189,482 1,176,424 1,082,259 840,389 829,077
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment, for
workers aged 20-55. Excludes recalls (workers returning to the same firm), self-employed and spells shorter than
15 days.
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is reduced in the FE regressions because most of the ability to search is specific to
each individual. Gaining more jobs does not greatly improve her chances of finding a
job after controlling for individual effects. This would make the differences in search
ability across workers more persistent.
The impact of temporary contracts on duration could be non-linear: after a cer-
tain amount of contracts the effect could turn positive. Table C.2 in Appendix C
shows the results after adding a quadratic term for the number of contracts. It
doesn’t make a substantial difference for most of the sample: it requires more than
100 temporary contracts for the effect to turn positive, 99% of observations lie out-
side this range. Another possible caveat is that the effect of temporary contracts
may vary for different industries. Table C.3 in Appendix C shows the results of the
regression in column 2 (pooled OLS, controlling for past wages) for each industry in
the next job. The coefficient on temporary jobs is always significant and negative,
suggesting these results hold true in general.
The effect of the length of UB entitlement in months is large. All of the claim
dummies are significant and positive. However, the biggest effect is not at the max-
imum entitlement period (24 months, claim24), but at 6 months in the pooled re-
gressions and between 6 and 12 months in the panel regressions. Being entitled to
between six months and a year increases time in unemployment by 22.8% (after
controlling for unemployment income, column 2). In the fixed effects regression, the
effect is smaller, between 16 and 20%. This again may reflect that different people
respond differently to the entitlement period of unemployment benefits. Once we
remove that unobserved characteristic, the increase is smaller. Compared to the
effect of unemployment income (log(UB)) it is clear that it is duration, not size of
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the benefits that drives longer unemployment duration.
On the other hand, Y Emp or years since last unemployment spell is significant at
the 1% level and positive in all regressions. Controlling for fixed effects also reduces
the size of its coefficient. The effect of tenure is greater (an increase of between 1.1
and 1.6% for each year in the last firm). A possible explanation is that a worker
that keeps herself employed by different firms, making job-to-job transitions has her
search skills relatively up to date. A worker who has “settled” in one company may
not have any incentives to search outside the firm (either because of increases in
job security, wages or both) and thus her search skills deteriorate faster. This inter-
pretation is appealing since the other channels through which tenure may have an
effect on unemployment duration are: benefit entitlement (already controlled for by
claim), higher past wages (a variable on its own) and severance payment (only for
those with a permanent contract, controlled for by Last P). The only explanations
left are the search channel or a matching effect: since a long past tenure suggests a
good match, the worker could be waiting for another good job.
Last P itself has a small but negative effect in the pooled regressions when con-
trolling for wages and UB size. However in the fixed effect regressions it has a
significant positive effect, extending unemployment duration by between 4 and 11%.
This may be interpreted as the contract type being used as a signal of higher skill to
employers. However the effect of higher skill could be partly controlled for by adding
wages, although workers don’t usually reveal their past wages (at least in their CVs)
whereas the type of contract is something that can be easily verified. So across
competing workers, having had a permanent contract helps them find a job. When
considering the effect across time for individual workers in the FE regressions, the
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effect is clearly positive. This likely relates to matching in a similar way to tenure:
the worker may not be willing to engage in temporary contracts again, but prefers
to wait longer for a permanent position.
The rest of the variables have the expected signs. The only exception is the size
of annual unemployment benefit (in logs, log(UB)) which is negative in pooled OLS.
A 1% increase of UB decreases the length of unemployment by 0.2%. As discussed
previously, it is the length, not the size of benefits that matters for durations. The
amount of benefits a worker gets are related to their previous wage, so it could be
that higher wage earners are also more skilled. However since wages themselves are
being controlled for by log(past wage), the remaining effect could be interpreted as
people with family responsibilities (who get extra money) leaving unemployment
slightly faster. In the fixed effects regression the sign becomes positive - although
it is very small. This also signals that once these differences across individuals are
removed, more UB means longer unemployment spells, but the effect enters mainly
through length rather than the amount paid.
Other variables like the quadratic term on age, the gender and industry dummies
can be seen in Appendix C, table C.1. There is a significant positive effect of being
previously employed in construction (compared with the base of being employed in
the agricultural sector) and the recession makes this effect even higher.
To complement the previous analysis, table 3.4 shows the result of the logis-
tic regression on the probability of becoming long term unemployed. The first two
columns take into account all unemployment spells, even those unfinished by the end
of 2013. This could lead to misleading results for unemployment spells starting in
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Table 3.4: Probability of Long-Term Unemployment
All Spells Finished Spells
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P (≥ 1year) P (≥ 2years) P (≥ 1year) P (≥ 2years)
No. T -0.087∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0031)
YEmp 0.007∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003 0.015∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0027)
3 months claim 0.481∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0163) (0.0144) (0.0239)
6 months claim 0.780∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0167) (0.0149) (0.0246)
12 months claim 1.045∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0209) (0.0202) (0.0314)
18 months claim 1.051∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(0.0196) (0.0260) (0.0272) (0.0412)
24 months claim 0.498∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0352) (0.0364) (0.0569)
Last P 0.238∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0148) (0.0134) (0.0213)
Tenure 0.038∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0045)
Experience -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0018)
No. P -0.146∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0097)
log(past wage) -0.211∗∗∗ -0.229∗∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0051) (0.0043) (0.0065)
log(UI) -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
age -0.018∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0066)
Constant -0.379∗∗∗ -0.766∗∗∗ 0.790 0.614
(0.0773) (0.1137) (0.5222) (0.6264)
Controls
Years - - - -
Industry X X X X
Occupation X X X X
Region X X X X
Observations 726,839 726,839 461,369 461369
AIC 603,127 327,490 369,427 173,783
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment,
for workers aged 20-55. Excludes recalls (workers returning to the same firm), self-employed and spells
shorter than 15 days.
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2012 onwards because of right-censoring of unemployment spells, so I consider only
finished spells only in columns 3-4. The number of temporary contracts is negatively
correlated with the probability of LTU, both when we consider LTU as 1 year or
more or 2 years or more. In particular, one extra temporary contract diminishes
the probability of LTU (as one or more years of unemployment) by 8.3% on average
(1 − e−0.063), and 12.8% for two years or more. These coefficients increase to 8.6%
and 12.6% respectively when only considering finished spells.
The coefficients on the right to claim dummies are all positively, as expected.
Having the right to claim for 18 months increases by 2.86 (e−1.105) the odds of end-
ing in long term unemployment (over one year), with a similar magnitude for only
unfinished spells. However, the quantity of unemployment benefits as measured by
log(UB) decreases the odds of LTU for finished and unfinished spells. This again
points out at the strong effect of unemployment benefit duration compared to the
amount workers receive. It is worth noticing that last wages are negatively correlated
with probability of LTU for all durations (an increase in past wages by 1% decreases
the chances of LTU by 20% for the average worker).
Years since last employment spell are also significant and positive. Its effects
are relatively modest (an increase of 0.7-1.8% per extra year since last time em-
ployed). Given the small coefficients of this variable in the previous regression, these
results suggests that having spent many years away from unemployment has a neg-
ative impact in future unemployment, spells, making them longer, as expected. The
coefficients of tenure are stronger, suggesting that tenure could be a more robust
indicator of search capital depreciation. The main difference between both is that
years since last employment spell ignores job-to-job transitions, while tenure resets
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with every new job. Finally, the coefficients for work experience are negative and
significant, as in the previous table.
Lastly having lost a permanent contract is positively correlated with the chances
of ending in long term unemployment. This corroborates the findings on the previ-
ous regression. The effects of age are once again quadratic, so although the linear
coefficient is negative the square term is positive, indicating that both young people
and mature workers are more likely to be found in long term unemployment than
middle aged workers.
Wages in the next job
Table 3.5 shows the outcomes of wage regressions, where log(next wage) is the natural
logarithm of annual wages in the job after the current unemployment spell. Column
1 show the results for all observations, while column 2 only includes jobs that last at
least three months and columns 3 only considers jobs that last at least six months.
These restrictions ensure that there is less noise in the dependent variable (log an-
nual wages in the next job), at the expense of reducing the sample size.
The first variable is weeks of unemployment spell, which is significant and neg-
ative throughout all regressions. This suggests that the longer the unemployment
spell, the lower future wages: each 1% increase in weeks of unemployment reduces
future wages by between 2.9 and 10.61%. As both variables are in logs, this can
be interpreted as a wage-unemployment elasticity. The negative coefficient implies
that spending more time in unemployment reduces future wages of workers, so it
becomes harder to justify that workers with longer unemployment spells are waiting
for a better offer. This implies that variables that were negatively correlated to du-
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Table 3.5: Regressions on Future Wages
(1) (2) (3)
log(next wage) log(next wage) log(next wage)
Sample all jobs jobs > 3 months jobs > 6 months
log(weeks) -0.1061∗∗∗ -0.0350∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0015)
No. T 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
YEmp 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
3 months claim 0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0069∗ -0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0038)
6 months claim 0.1203∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0077
(0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0041)
12 months claim 0.1479∗∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗ 0.0192∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0050) (0.0056)
18 months claim 0.1447∗∗∗ 0.0525∗∗∗ 0.0345∗∗∗
(0.0078) (0.0067) (0.0075)
24 months claim 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0201∗
(0.0096) (0.0083) (0.0095)
Last P 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0113∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0036)
Tenure 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0011
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008)
No. P 0.0025∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Experience 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
log(past wage) 0.1261∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.0502∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0015)
age 0.0434∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Constant 7.1325∗∗∗ 8.0257∗∗∗ 8.0363∗∗∗
(0.2263) (0.2689) (0.3124)
Controls
Years X X X
Industry X X X
Occupation X X X
Region X X X
Observations 465,832 199,679 123,238
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.203 0.250
AIC 1,284,934 278,985 135,067
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment,
for workers aged 20-55. Excludes recalls (workers returning to the same firm) and self-employment
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ration have a positive impact on wages by shortening the unemployment spell. The
effects of these variables should be interpreted as their marginal effects independent
of duration.
One of the variables that both reduces duration and increases wages is the num-
ber of temporary contracts. Its coefficient is small (between 0.89% and 0.18%). For
a median annual wage of 20,672 euros, an extra temporary contract adds between
183 and 37 euros annually. The small effects suggest that the number of temporary
contracts is only weakly positively related to wages, both directly and through its
negative impact on unemployment duration. This is an important result because it
shows that workers with more temporary contracts (that are better searchers) do
not find worse jobs than other workers on average. There are in fact slightly better
paid.
Years since last employment (Y Emp) is significant and positive, suggesting that
having spent long times since the last unemployment spell doesn’t hurt the job
prospects of workers. A possible interpretation could be that workers that have lost
their search skills after a long period of employment eventually find similar jobs to
other workers, reinforcing the idea that search skills are not the same as productive
skills.
Log past wages are highly correlated with present wages, as expected. The co-
efficients of claiming period dummies become smaller for longer jobs, with 3 month
claim coefficient turning negative for jobs longer than 3 months. These dummies rep-
resent the effects are over someone without the right to claim UB, suggesting that
longer entitlement to unemployment benefits may improve wages via better match-
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ing quality or better outside option. The absence of the quantity of unemployment
benefits is due to its effects on sample size, as it requires to match two firms and her
unemployment benefits with the tax records.
The coefficient for the dummy for permanent contract is positive for all next
job durations. The coefficient for tenure is insignificant, suggesting that maybe the
effects of longer tenure (higher probability of depreciated search skills) are picked
up by LastP and Y Emp. Age and work experience are significant and positive, as
expected. I interpret this as evidence of human capital accumulation - aside from
individual productivity which is meant to be captures by past wages.
Duration of next job spell
Finally table 3.6 shows the results of the regressions on next job duration. The first
three columns are for pooled data (one spell, one observation) and the last three are
for fixed effect regressions, as table 3.3 did. Columns 1 and 4 show the regressions
where duration of next job in log(weeks) is the dependant variable, while 2 and 4
have the next employment spell as the dependant variable, that is, considering not
only how long the next job is but all the subsequent employment spells until the
next time the worker is unemployed. This could be a better measure for temporary
workers who may gain permanent contracts in subsequent jobs, or may get other
temporary contracts. Finally columns 3 and 6 show the results of a logistic regres-
sion where the dependent variable is the probability of obtaining a permanent job
after the end of the current unemployment spell - which is one if the next job is
permanent and zero if it is temporary. Only 8% of all unemployment spells in the
sample end in a permanent contract, so this is a rare occurrence. These regressions
aim to capture how stable the jobs that are found by workers are.
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Table 3.6: Regressions on duration of next job
Pooled data Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of next Duration of next Duration of next Duration of next
job (log weeks) employment spell Pr(Pt+1|Ut) job (log weeks) employment spell Pr(Pt+1|Ut)
No. T -0.051∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0020) (0.0054) (0.0035) (0.0081)
log(weeks) 0.180∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.016∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ -0.000 0.003
(0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0057) (0.0040) (0.0021) (0.0112)
YEmp 0.016∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0058)
3 months claim 0.114∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.022 -0.051∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.044
(0.0079) (0.0063) (0.0166) (0.0105) (0.0064) (0.0292)
6 months claim 0.163∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.031∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0180) (0.0136) (0.0094) (0.0366)
12 months claim 0.138∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ 0.148∗
(0.0134) (0.0153) (0.0248) (0.0220) (0.0184) (0.0580)
18 months claim 0.028 0.028 0.038 0.172∗∗∗ -0.045 0.106
(0.0184) (0.0248) (0.0324) (0.0331) (0.0327) (0.0892)
24 months claim -0.054∗ -0.100∗∗ 0.005 0.333∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.0232) (0.0344) (0.0397) (0.0440) (0.0517) (0.1202)
Last P 0.105∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗
(0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0153) (0.0112) (0.0081) (0.0248)
Tenure 0.003 0.045∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.062∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0103)
Experience (T) 0.037∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.512∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0093) (0.0079) (0.0257)
Experience (P) 0.016∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗ -0.211∗∗∗ -0.780∗∗∗ -0.177∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0183)
No. P -0.014∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0119) (0.0158)
log(past wage) 0.075∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0056) (0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0094)
log(UI) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0007)
age 0.035∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.004 0.266∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0048) (0.0127) (0.0091) (0.0268)
Constant -0.091 -0.331 -3.395∗∗∗ -2.746∗∗∗ -1.853∗∗∗
(0.3614) (0.3031) (0.0937) (0.5832) (0.3216)
Controls
Years X X X X X X
Industry X X X X X X
Occupation X X - X X -
Region X X - X X -
Observations 461,300 357,914 472,006 461,300 357,914 77,992
Adjusted R2 0.158 0.133 - 0.063 0.258 -
AIC 1,747,415 1,068,172 284,635 1,373,508 576,323 45,637
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment, for workers aged 20-55. Excludes
recalls (workers returning to the same firm), self-employed and spells shorter than 15 days.
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Looking at the pooled regressions, number of temporary contracts appears to be
bad for job stability on average: new jobs are shorter the more temporary contracts
you have. This is true when future job duration is restricted to 6 months at least (for
consistent wages and to keep very short/menial jobs out of the sample). But when
we look at its impact through time in the fixed effects regressions, as the worker
accumulates more jobs the duration of next jobs becomes longer too. This suggests
that learning to search helps workers get jobs with longer durations as well as higher
paying jobs, within individuals. These results are the same for the probability of
getting a permanent job out of unemployment. The fact that we need to control for
individual fixed effects to see a positive impact suggests that there is an unobserved
component that makes some workers more prone to stability. All regressions have
controls for occupational level and industry, so this unobservable factor seems to be
independent from sectoral composition. Another interpretation is that workers with
many temporary contracts are very good at finding jobs, and are less concerned with
employment stability - this is not to say that they wouldn’t prefer more stable jobs,
but that they are willing to accept short jobs more often than workers who are not
used to temporary contracts.
This observation, together with the fact that people with more temporary jobs
finds jobs faster, suggests a trade-off of waiting for a more stable job versus staying
in unemployment for longer. What may be a good strategy when the job market
is booming could turn into a higher chance of long term unemployment during re-
cessions: if the jobs available in recessions are worse (as the rise in part-time and
shorter TC suggest) being willing to accept an unstable job can keep a worker out
of long term unemployment.
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Conversely, years since last unemployment spell (Y Emp) has a positive impact
in the cross section, but the fixed effects regressions shows a negative correlation
with future employment duration.
Longer unemployment spells (log(weeks)) have an ambiguous effect of future job
stability: they are positively correlated to duration of the next job (columns 1 and 4)
but mildly negatively with the duration of the next job spell (taking into account fu-
ture jobs as well). It also reduced the odds of being hired with a permanent contract
out of unemployment in the pooled regression (column 3), but it becomes insignif-
icant in the panel regression (6). Past wages and unemployment benefits generally
increase next job duration and the odds of being hired with a permanent contract,
except in the fixed effects regression on duration of the next job. Age is positively
related to job duration, and more strongly so if we consider continuous employment
instead of just one job (columns 2 and 5 versus 1 and 4).
3.4 Theoretical Model
I have presented evidence of the positive effect of having more jobs can have in future
unemployment outcomes, including controls for other potential explanations (human
capital, incentives to search and ladder-claiming effects).
Here I present a search model with savings that introduces search capital as a
mechanism that affects workers job finding probabilities that evolves through time as
the worker learns to search. The goal of the model is to show that the introduction
of search capital into an otherwise conventional model helps to explain the evolution
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of unemployment patterns through a workers life (particularly in the early years). A
standard model with a constant, single job finding rate produces flat flows through-
out a workers life. With search capital, the composition of the unemployment pool
changes over time, as searchers get better with age.
The model joins two separate strands of the search literature. First, dynamic
models with savings and human capital depreciation as in Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2008) and Kitao et al. (2017) give the means and motive for older workers to re-
main unemployed for long. The means are that older workers have more resources to
wait for better employment, whereas the motive is the desire to smooth out income
shocks derive from the loss of employment (and human capital). In this models the
loss of human capital upon job loss means that the jobs they are going to find once
unemployed are worse than the job they lost. In this way it is the ‘ladder’ compo-
nent of human capital that motivates older workers to wait. The second strand is
the dual-market literate as in Blanchard and Landier (2002), Güell (2003), Costain
et al. (2010) and Bentolila et al. (2012) among others. In these models temporary
contracts are modelled explicitly. However, most of these models are focusing on
the relation between heterogeneous firing costs and unemployment, so they assume
hand-to-mouth, risk neutral workers, which leaves out the consumption smoothing
motive. These mechanisms should play a key role in shaping worker’s preferences
over temporary and permanent contracts. In their absence, most of the literature im-
poses the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones, or assumes higher
wages under permanent contracts.16
16A few notable exceptions to this include Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) and Cozzi and Fella
(2016). The latter shows the effect that risk aversion and consumption smoothing can have in the
presence of tenure-increasing severance payments.
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In order to model the effects of search capital as workers age, I use a dual-market
model that allows workers to save and be risk averse, in the spirit of Cozzi and Fella
(2016). In this way, young workers would not have enough savings to smooth out
consumption while unemployed so they will accept worse jobs. As they age, if they
manage to save more, they will become more selective on their jobs they choose. Here
a permanent contract offers not only higher and stable earnings. Search capital can
alter these patterns, by making experienced young workers more efficient at search
and older workers that lose a job after tenure less efficient at search. Which of the
two effects dominates drives the results from the model.
Adding dual markets, savings, risk aversion and search capital makes for a rich
but complicated model. In order to keep the model simple while retaining elements
outlined above, I make some simplifying assumptions on other aspects of the econ-
omy. The main assumption is the absence of the firm’s problem from the model.
Workers draw an offer from an exogenous distribution and accept or reject the job.
The assumption of a fixed wage instead of wage bargaining or another wage-setting
mechanism may be strong, as it implies little correlation between present and future
wages. An alternative would be to introduce some form of general human capital (as
in Kitao et al. (2017)). But given how stable permanent jobs are, and because asset
accumulation allows workers to increase their reservation wages, the random search
assumption is not as strong as it initially appears. In fact it is not too far from
match-specific productivity in search and matching models. Moving away from par-
tial equilibrium, the ideal alternative would be to introduce wage bargaining. This
would not change the results much, it would only introduce a connection between the
external option of workers and unemployment - through less vacancy posting. There
is also the concern that the wage distributions from the model would not correspond
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to those in the data, particularly for lower wages. Here the introduction of expiring
unemployment benefits implies that poor young workers are willing to accept the
lowest wage of the distribution.
Another important assumption is the introduction of a no-borrowing constraint
that binds for the poorest individuals. In light of the lack of unemployment benefits
for a large share of workers as early as 2010. I consider this addition an important
feature, and it helps match the observed wage distributions, especially at the lower
end. It also gives risk averse workers incentives to save, in order to self-insure against
long unemployment spells that may result in them being close to the constraint. The
financial aspect of the model is not of primary interest, but a similar framework could
easily be adapted to think about financial problems, such as tightening borrowing
constraints or housing. The fact that financial constraints are secondary in the model
is helped by its being a partial equilibrium model, so households take the interest
rate as given. Finally, I will not look into inequality but search capital speaks to it
from another point of view: the workers that achieve stability get the best outcomes,
but are also exposed to greater risk if they lose their job.
There are other aspects of the model that are not very common: unemployment
benefits expire and not all worker are covered by them. This is important to accu-
rately reflect the problems young workers in Spain face, both before and during the
crisis: as they have not accumulated enough assets, the threat of low consumption
makes them lower their standards for employment such that very temporary, low
wage jobs are accepted. As workers build up a stock of assets, they are able to raise
their reservation wages and access better jobs.
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3.4.1 Value functions
Time is discrete, and one time unit corresponds to a month. Workers are risk averse
and live indefinitely. Agents can save but can’t borrow. They accumulate capital by
saving their income in each period, and can be employed with a permanent contract
(P ), employed with a temporary contract (T ), unemployed with unemployment ben-
efits (U) and unemployed without unemployment benefits (0). They are born with
zero assets and an initial level of search capital s0.
Search capital is discrete, increasing with a stochastic probability each time the
worker finds a job from unemployment, and decreasing with a stochastic probability
each period the worker is employed in a long-term (permanent) job.
Employed workers
Permanent and temporary jobs differ in four fundamental aspects: workers in per-
manent jobs accumulate job-specific human capital (h), which increases their wages.
Both kinds of jobs suffer a stochastic, exogenous job destruction rate, but it hits
temporary jobs more often(δT >> δP ). If a temporary job is destroyed, with prob-
ability δT 0 the worker is not eligible for unemployment benefits; permanent workers
are always entitled to unemployment benefits after losing their jobs. Finally, per-
manent workers receive external (temporary) offers with probability αP T and can
choose to leave or stay, while temporary workers get a promotion to a permanent
job with probability αT P . I allow for them to refuse the offer and go back to the
unemployment pool without benefits. By design, an entry-level (h = 0) permanent
job is always preferable to a temporary job with the same wage: in a permanent po-
sition wages can only increase and unemployment risk is lower (and always insured).
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Permanent workers suffer a stochastic risk of search capital depreciation π−s′|s each
period, while temporary workers are able to keep their search capital. This assump-
tion reflects both that temporary workers change jobs often (so they are able to keep
their knowledge “fresh”) and that many permanent workers are likely to retire in the
job they get.
This is the continuation value if the worker chooses to stay in her current employ-
ment, but I allow workers to quit to unemployment if they find it more profitable.
This could be the case if the worker accepts a low wage job when assets are low, but
as she builds up capital she decides to search again. I assume temporary quitters
are not entitled to benefits, but permanent workers are. The value functions are:
V T (w, a, s) = u(c(w, a)) + βmax{V 0(a′, s), Ṽ T (w, a′, s)} (3.4)
Ṽ T (w, a′, s) = αT P max {V 0(a′, s), V P (w, 0, a′, s)}+ δTV U0 (a′, s) + (1− δT − αT P )V T (w, a′, s)
st.
c+ a′ ≥ (1 + r)a+ w
V P (w, h, a, s) = u(c(w, a)) + βmax{V U(a′, s), Ṽ P (w, h′, a′, s′)}
Ṽ P (w, h′, a′, s′) = αP T
∫
max{V P (w, h, a, s), V T (w′, a, s)}dF (w′) + δPV U(a′, s)+
(1− δP − αP T )
[




c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ w(h)
s′ = π−s′|ss′ + (1− π−s′|s)s
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Where Ṽ j(w, h, a, s) denotes continuation value of current employment and apostro-
phes denote next period variables. No time subscripts are necessary as the four state
variables suffice to describe the workers’ problem. Search capital depreciation follows
a Markov process with downgrading probability of π−s′|s and upgrading probability
of 0 - the assumption is that any external job offers arrive exogenously and don’t
contribute to search capital.
Human capital is limited to the firm, and this could be a strong assumption.
However it is equivalent to models with full depreciation of human capital upon job
loss. I also choose to ignore retirement decisions by assuming a stochastic drop-out
rate (β = β̃ + ρ). The reasons for this are that I am more interested in young and
middle aged worker’s dynamics, as other authors have written extensively over how
long-term unemployment interacts with retirement decisions.17 A straightforward
extension would be to set the model in finite time and introduce age-specific shocks,
like retirement. This would help match the older workers’ unemployment. Asset
accumulation still affects the patterns of unemployment over the lifetime via reser-
vation wages, whereby older workers are able to afford to wait longer.
Unemployed workers
If receiving unemployment benefits agents receive b and if they run out of benefits
they receive zero18 and have to use their assets for consumption - as a retired person
would do. All unemployed agents search for a job each period, and successfully get
a job offer of type j ∈ {P, T}. The arrival rate αj(s) is increasing in search capital
s. The job consists of a take-it-or-leave it entry wage offer w. If she accepts it,
17See Kitao et al. (2017), Ljungqvist and Sargent (2008)
18Technically they receive 1 unit to prevent them from starving.
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with probability π+s′|s her search capital increases and with complementary probabil-
ity (1-π+s′|s) she stays at her current level. The assumption is that only successful
searchers contribute to increase workers’ search capital. Also if workers learn for fail-
ures this would create positive duration dependence, which is not present in the data.
If receiving unemployment benefits, the worker can lose her benefits with prob-
ability δ0 in each period. The stochastic benefit expiration rate helps to keep the
model simple by not keeping track of previous employment history. The stock of
search capital is the only history-dependent state variable, besides from assets and
human capital for permanent workers.









max {V U(a′, s), V P (w, a′, s′)}dF (w)+




c+ a′ = (1 + r)a+ b
s′ = π+s′ss′ + (1− π+s′s)s













c+ a′ = (1 + r)a
s′ = π+s′ss′ + (1− π+s′s)s
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Solving the Model
A solution to the model is a set of reservation wage rules and policy functions for
savings such that: (1) workers maximise their utility given their initial states (2) the
reservation wages are consistent with the implied value functions.
I solve this problem by value function iteration. The use of first order conditions
would be faster, but it is complicated by the “kinks” that result from the discrete
choices (accept/reject a job for the unemployed and quit for the employed). The
addition of search capital as discrete state variable adds to the dimensionality of the
problem. Moreover, as the problem becomes highly non-linear close to the borrowing
constraint (low assets/low wages combinations) functional approximation is compli-
cated. All these factors make VFI a slow but safe choice.
Once the policy functions have been found, I simulate the economy from 40 years
to find a steady state for the economy and see the evolution of unemployment through
the working lives of workers. This also provides moments to compare to the data:
average stock of employment/unemployment and flows between states at each age
and in the aggregate.
3.4.2 Calibration
Preferences
The utility function is CRRA, with a risk aversion parameter of 2. Interest rates are




FT (w) - wage distribution for TCs
FP (w) - wage distribution for PCs new hires
b 695.52 average UB
αT (1) 0.116 UT transition rates at age 20
αP (1) 0.019 UP transition rates at age 20
αT P 0.023 average TP flow
αP T 0.226 average PT rates, modified*
δP 0.007 average PU flow
δT 0.030 average TU flow
δT 0 0.15 average T0 flow
δ0 0.079 average U0 flow
p(h) - tenure wage distribution
s0,s1,s2 {0.666,1,1.666} duration of unemployment for different NoTs
π+s′|s {1,1,0} duration of unemployment for different NoTs
π−s′|s {0,0.0507,0.0507} 5 year average
r 0.0016 2% annual19
β 0.98
σ 2.0 Literature
* consistent with the share of workers at age 20 that accept an average temporary the job offer.
Wage Distributions
The wage distributions that workers face are taken from the actual wage distributions
in the years 2005-2008 as shown in the histogram in figure 3.5. They are binned
from 60 to 6000 euros a month and normalised. I let the distribution of wages out of
unemployment vary, but when temporary workers get a promotion they start from
their temporary wage. To get the human capital coefficients that drive wage increases
for permanent workers I look at the evolution of wage distributions on stayers. Here
I assume for simplicity a linear wage increase with tenure (so w(h) = w ∗ h) and
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Figure 3.6: Tenure-Wage distributions


































Source: Own calculations and MCVL, 2005-2013 waves, fiscal annex
minimize the distance between the observed distributions. The results are shown in
picture 3.6. These assumptions ensure that wage evolution is consistent with the
data.
Employment shocks and job arrival rates
Figure 3.7 shows the average monthly transition rates by age between employment
an unemployment, for temporary and permanent contracts. The first thing the plot
shows is that there are reasons to prefer a constant job separation rate, at least from
temporary contracts (bottom left panel). Job expiration being constant is more
difficult to justify but keeping track of past tenure can make the model too large.
Simply controlling for age could solve this issue. At present the model relies on the
change of reservation wages/job finding rates through time to match young workers
unemployment rates.
Getting an estimate of job offers arrival rates is not trivial, as they are a com-
bination of reservation wages and actual job arrival rates. I choose to target job
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finding rates at age 20 - the age I take as a “start of the working life” for workers.
By assuming new entrants have no assets and no search capital, I can take the job
finding rates in the data as the true arrival rate of offers, as these workers accept any
wage offer they receive. This ensures reservation wages do not cloud the calibration.
In the results it can be seen that this assumption makes the patterns of job finding
rates consistent with the data.
Finally the permanent to temporary arrival rate is subject to reservation wage
constraints, as not all workers accept a job, not even the very young ones. I take
a similar approach by targeting the job switching rate at age 20, solve the model,
and then calculate how many permanent workers would switch if offered the average
temporary wage. Given this estimate, I update20 the job offer arrival rate and solve
again.
Search capital parameters
I assume a simple structure for search capital: three levels, that result in three pro-
portional job finding rates (αj(s) = ᾱjs). Search capital parameters are not pinned
down, so they could be estimated by minimising the distance to some moments in
the data. Instead I take estimates of s by targeting the differences in job finding
rates at age 20 with different number of jobs held before. Using the assumption
that workers enter the labour market with no assets, figure 3.8 shows on the right
the implied duration profiles at the three different levels of search capital (so that
s2 > s1 > s0) while the left panel shows a histogram of duration of unemployment in
the data, separated by number of temporary contracts. The substantial differences
at short durations of unemployment for even one temporary contract suggests that
20α1P T = α0P T /SP T , where SP T is the proportion of permanent workers age 20 that accept an
average temporary wage offer.
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Figure 3.7: Monthly Transition Rates by Age (pre 2008, SS)
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Source: Own calculations from MCVL, 2005-2013 waves
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setting π+s′|s = 1 is reasonable. I repeat the exercise with smaller π+s′|s to match the
differences between the shortest durations. For π−s′|s, the depreciation rates of search
capital, I target a search capital loss every 5 years of tenure. Repeating the exer-
cise with alternative depreciation rates (10,20,25 years) yields very similar results.
In order to match the data the initial distribution of search capital is more important.
Figure 3.8: Duration of unemployment by number of contracts and search capital
level






























Source: Own calculations from MCVL, 2005-2013 waves
Initial distributions
In order to match the job finding rates in the data it is important to acknowledge
that some workers enter the labour market with a job in hand. I set the initial dis-
tribution of workers among states (unemployed with and without benefits, employed
with a temporary and permanent contract) to match the data at age 20. For assets
I assume all individuals start from 0 at age 20. For search capital, it is important
to acknowledge that some workers aged 20 have had temporary jobs before entering
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unemployment for the first time. Therefore I choose give the lowest level of search
capital (s0) to new entrants (unemployed with no benefits) and level one to the
rest. This is because in the data those receiving unemployment benefits must have
accumulated enough job experience to be able to claim benefits. And indeed for
unemployed workers less than 25 years old the average number of temporary jobs
held before unemployment is lower among those without unemployment benefits (3




Figure 3.9 to 3.11 present the main results. Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of the
shares of the three levels of search capital through workers lives, for all workers (left
panel) and the unemployed (right panel). Over time, workers find stable jobs and
search capital decreases: the proportion of bad searchers (s0) increases with time.
During the first five years, the stock of good searchers (s2) increases as workers go
through chains of temporary contracts, but then it decreases again to steady-state
levels. By the time workers are 40, the overall search levels have reached steady state.
Notice that the distribution is polarized by the end, with bad and good searchers
having the highest shares. If we look at the unemployment pool, we see that at the
beginning unemployed agents are not good searchers. Then as time goes by search
capital increases - workers become more experienced in the labour market - but only
at the end the stock of very good searchers increases as well. This is interesting
because it shows that older unemployed workers are better searchers on average,
so their lower transition rates to employment come from their higher levels of self
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insurance that allows them to be more selective with their future jobs. This is the
same mechanism as in the turbulence literature, which proves adequate to describe
older worker dynamics.
Figure 3.9: Search Capital by age
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Figure 3.10 shows the evolution of unemployment and the temporary share of
employment in the data and in the model. Having an accurate description of the
temporary share of jobs is important for matching the average number of jobs workers
have. The left panel of figure 3.10 shows that the model performs well, matching the
temporary share for all ages until age 45, where it stays constant instead of steadily
declining. These are the effects of the infinite horizon problem. In terms of unem-
ployment, the right panel of figure 3.10 shows that the model does particularly well
for overall unemployment, and underestimates unemployment without benefits for
the young. This last result can be explained by the constant unemployment benefit
expiration rate (U0) as panel 6 in figure 3.11 shows. While the inclusion of tenure
related severance payments could be added in a similar manner to Dolado et al.
(2016), making expiration of unemployment tenure related is more complicated, as
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Figure 3.10: Temporary share and Unemployment rate
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not only tenure but past tenure becomes a state variable. An alternative would be
to use the framework developed by Andersen et al. (2017).
In terms of other flows, figure 3.11 shows yearly averages of monthly transition
rates in the data and in the model, so that the data point at age 20 represents the 12
month average between years 20 and 21. The model matches the evolution of tempo-
rary job finding rates well (panel 1), with flows from unemployment without benefits
(0T) being above those from unemployment (UT) both in the model and in the data.
The evolution of search capital explains the high transition rates of those aged 20-30,
and follows the decline over the 30s. Transition rates from regular unemployment are
slightly above the data after age 30, staying above 8% per month, but they also fol-
low a pattern of steady decline. Unemployed at age 30 are better searchers, but also
have accumulated enough wealth and benefits to self insure against unemployment
risk, allowing them to be more selective with the jobs they get. Flows to permanent
jobs (UP, panel 2) are close to the data, but the model overestimates them for young
people (less than 28 years old) and underestimates them for over 40’s. This is likely
to be what is driving the decline of the temporary share in the data (figure 3.10. A
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Figure 3.11: Transition rates
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likely explanation for this is the lack of transferable human capital: older workers
may still carry some knowledge from their previous jobs that gets them better wages.
The permanent to temporary transition rate (PT, panel 5) follows its data coun-
terpart closely: it overshoots at the beginning21 but then follows the data remarkably
well. These transitions defy conventional explanations, as in most models of dual
labour markets with temporary contracts workers always prefer a permanent job to
a temporary one. Here this is still true for permanent jobs with the same wage as a
current job, but workers may be tempted to leave for better outcomes, even if these
are uncertain. Switching jobs increases their search capital, which is another form of
self-insurance against risks and allows them to climb the wage ladder. An alternative
interpretation would be to increase the firing rate for permanent workers, but with
advance notice - that is, giving workers time to find a temporary job before their
current contract ends. This would add to the instability of permanent contracts for
young workers.
Job destruction rates from temporary contracts (panel 2) do not follow the pat-
terns in the data, which is to be expected since a constant job firing rate was assumed,
however job separations from permanent contracts (panel 4) do follow the pattern in
the data (overshooting at the very beginning). The difference here is that for young
workers with a low wage permanent contract it is profitable to quit after some period
of saving, to unemployment. Recall that the assumption, based on the data, was
that quitters from permanent contracts get unemployment benefits, but that this is
not the case for temporary jobs. This could be the driving difference, but there is an
upwards trend in the temporary separation rate for older workers: older unemployed
21Recall that the flow plots are yearly averages: by construction the PT rate at age 20 matches
the data exactly.
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Figure 3.12: Duration of unemployment, by search capital


















































individuals may take temporary jobs to bump their savings up, and then quit. Their
search capital is high on average (as figure 3.9 showed) and they can therefore afford
to quit and search again.
Finally, if we look at duration of unemployment by age, figure 3.12 shows that
the gap between high skilled searchers (s2) and the rest widens with age, with low
skilled searchers and moderately skilled searchers become closer. The bulk of these
long term unemployed workers over 2 years is almost entirely made up of moderately
and low skilled searchers (s1 and s0). Notice that if we considered all search abilities
the duration distribution would become more skewed towards the extremes, which
can cause observational duration dependence.
No search capital
To better understand what search capital adds to the model, figure 3.13 shows
monthly flows with and without search capital - so there is a constant job find-
ing rate. The main difference is that job finding rates are flatter: the temporary
128
Figure 3.13: Transition rates without search capital
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job finding rate among unemployed workers without benefits who are younger than
35 is lower and constant. For unemployed workers with UB the results are similar,
indicating that its decline over time is driven by asset accumulation only. These
patterns also hold for transitions to permanent jobs (panel 3). Another significant
difference is the permanent separation rate in panel 4: under a constant job finding
rate it is flat and low. Search capital can explain the patterns of the data better (as
the same panel in figure 3.11 indicated) as young workers quit low wage permanent
contracts in search of better outcomes. However here the absence of search capital
makes these quits unprofitable. I leave further analysis for future work.
3.5 Conclusion
Treating job search as a skill that can be gained and forgotten over time brings new
insights to old problems. It provides an explanation as to why young workers can
be stuck in long term unemployment, especially in a recession when they have to
compete for fewer jobs with better searchers. For older workers, having outdated
knowledge of the job market can also hurt their chances of finding one, even if they
retain some of their past human capital. Labour markets in which some workers are
over-protected from unemployment while others experience it very frequently exac-
erbate the differences in search capital, which could potentially expose the economy
to sharp increases in long term unemployment.
Using a detailed administrative dataset I identify the number of temporary jobs
held by a worker as a proxy for search capital, as temporary workers are more exposed
to unemployment. Using tenure, work experience, wages in the last job and other
controls, I regress duration of completed unemployment spells against the number
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of temporary contracts held to date finding a significant negative correlation. The
effects are still significant after introducing individual fixed effects. Years since last
unemployment spell, a variable intended to capture search skill depreciation, is posi-
tively correlated with duration, while tenure and duration of unemployment benefits
also seem to play a major role.
It could be that workers who are more exposed to temporary contracts find worse
jobs, but regressions on future wages show a positive effect, both by reducing dura-
tion of unemployment (which is negatively linked to wages) and directly, although
this last effect is more modest. The number of temporary jobs is negatively corre-
lated with duration of the next job and probability of finding a permanent contract,
but after controlling for fixed effects its coefficient turns positive. This suggests that
as workers accumulate search experience they get better jobs, faster.
The empirical evidence provides support for search capital being significant for
individual outcomes. To address the impact in the aggregate labour market I build
a search model with savings and risk aversion and introduce search capital. I use the
empirical wage distributions and transition rates for the years 2005-2008 in Spain
to calibrate the model. The addition of search capital to the model helps to recon-
cile the patterns of unemployment and job finding rates through a worker’s lifetime,
especially for young people. As workers get older the unemployed get better at
searching, but overall search capital decreases as workers find stable jobs. These
results are based on a limited partial equilibrium setting, but a model with an ag-
gregate matching function and firms could provide further insights, as could adding
a more detailed human capital accumulation process and retirement. Search capital
could enrich the hysteresis literature by improving the performance of models for
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younger workers.
Finally, search capital adds a different perspective to the debate on labour market
institutions and flexibility in Europe: more dynamic and flexible labour markets are
more volatile but can also be more resilient to aggregate shocks. Active labour market
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A.1 Step-by-Step guide to work with the MCVL
This appendix provides technical guidance on how to turn the raw csv files from
the MCVL into a panel dataset in Stata, similar to the Labour Force Survey (LFS)
panelling format. It extends Section 1.2.2 and includes more details on how to
combine the different files, create and select new variables and build a panel. Do
files that follow these steps can be provided upon request.
There are four main blocks: formatting, binding, implementing unemployment
extensions and panel formatting.
1. Formatting
There are two ways of formatting the MCVL: year-by-year panel and retrospective
panel:
• The year-by-year panel uses the information in all waves of the MCVL
separately. This allows to take into account workers who are in some waves
but not in others (see Garcia-Perez, 2009) and keeps the representatively of
the population in every year.
• The retrospective panel uses information from the latest available year only.
Although some representative of the sample is sacrificed, it is easier to study
unemployment duration as there are no “cuts” or overlapping spells as in the
year-by-year version.
As described in the main body of chapter 1, there may be applications where
one or the other is preferable. In what follows I describe the year-by-year panel
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approach, as it is more complex and appropriate for unemployment measurement.
The same steps are needed for the retrospective panel, but there is no need to limit
spell duration to be within the year they are reported, which makes things simpler.
1.1 Formatting Affiliation files
Open the ASCII files for each year, name the variables according to the MCVL
guide. Be careful as the position of variables as it changes through years. Then
format the dates of start (alta) and and end (baja) of each spell, which together with
the personal identifiers define each spell.
Next proceed to clean the overlapping spells (spells beginning before the end of
the previous spell) as in Garcia-Perez (2008) cases a (total overlap) and b (partial
overlap). For total overlaps, keep the longest continuous spell and drop smaller spells
that happen at the same time. For partial overlaps, make the continuing spells start
when the previous ends.
It is time to create the most important variable: labour market status during
the spell. I chose to make this a string variable - which will be convenient when
creating flows - but a labelled numerical value would work as well. For this we need
to combine the information of 4 other variables:
• Tipo de relacion con la seguridad social, codes 700-800 correspond to unem-
ployment benefit claimants. Mark as unemployed (“U”).
• Tipo de contrato, codes 400-900 correspond to temporary contracts. Mark as
temporay, “T”.
• Tipo de contrato, codes 99-400 correspond to permanent contracts22. Mark as
22Note that some of these contracts may be fijos discontinuos, that is, permanent workers that
only work for part of the year. They are different than temporary workers because they don’t have
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permanent, “P”. There is an exception though: code 540 corresponds to partial
retirement, so I mark this as out-of-the-labour-force (OLF). Also those whose
variable regimen de cotizacion is 140 are in early retirement - so I mark them
as OLF as well.
• Regimen de cotizacion, codes 500-600 correspond to self-employment. I mark
them as ”A” for Spanish autonomos23.
You may also want to create other auxiliary variables, such as an indicator for part-
time contracts. For this you can refer to the accompanying .do file or refer to the
official guide. The variable for this is Tipo de contrato.
Important: the variables Empleador (forma Judirica) - Letra NIF de la Entidad
Pagadora and Identificador (NIF/CIF) anonimado de la entidad pagadora uniquely
identify firms both in the affiliation files and in the fiscal file. If you want to use wage
information, make sure to create a variable that joins both into one string variable.
I call this variable firmID and move it right after the worker identifier.
1.2 Formatting pension files:
Name the variables according to the official guide. If using for labour market flows,
most of this variables are irrelevant, but keep the dates (and format them accord-
ingly) and the personal identification number.
a contract expiration rate and are protected by severance payments. If the reserchers wants to treat
them differently, their contracts correspond to codes 300-400.
23If you want to be really precise, you should mark those whose Regimen de cotizacion is equal
to 700-800 and 824-840 as self employed. These are the cases of farmers and sea captains.
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1.3 Formatting personal information files:
Name the variables according to the official guide.
Special care should be taken with the variable fecha de defuncion that marks
the death date of some workers who passed. The birth date should also be consid-
ered carefully as there are some likely mistakes - most famously a worker who was
supposedly born in 1906 and was still working in 2005 - likely a coding error for
1960.
Ideally the 2011-2012 personal file should be the most up-to-date information as
there was a census in 2011. It is recommend to impose the values of the education
variables from 2012 onwards over earlier years, whenever possible.
There are some exceptional cases of repeated personal identifiers. I chose to keep
the youngest of the two, but whatever criteria you use, keep only one so it can merge
easily with the affiliation file.
2. Binding
2.1 Binding the files together: pensions
Year by year, open the formatted affiliation file and append the pension file to it.
sort by date. If the final observation of a person is an entry from the pension file
(easily identifiable because all affiliation file variable will be blank) then fill in their
labour market status variable as OLF. Then fill in all the information missing in this
last entry from the previous spell (place of residence, for example). Delete all other
pension entries if you are only interested in labour market flows.24
24For example, Some disability or widowhood pensions can be received while in the labour force.
If these are of no interest for the study, they can be committed.
142
2.2 Binding the files together: personal information
Merge the formatted personal file and the affiliation file (with pension informa-
tion) together, using the personal identifier as joining variable. It should match
virtually all cases. For the rare exceptions, I choose to keep the affiliation registered
without personal information but drop the personal information entries without a
matching affiliation entry.
Now it is a good time to drop all spells that happen before the current wave year
- so 2006 only has spells active in the period 1st January 2006 onwards. This would
ease the binding process below. Skip this step for the earliest year in the sample if
you want keep retrospective information before the start of the sample25. You can
keep retrospective information for all years, but that would make the merging years
together process more cumbersome. Whenever in doubt, keep all spells.
Important: create a variable called year and set it equal to the file year. This
will help you identify the information that each wave brings to the unified panel.
Save the enriched affiliation files.
2.3 Binding all years together
Start with the earliest year in the dataset.26 Drop all spells starting further than
the 31st of December - modify the end date of the spell so it is 31st December. This
right censoring should ensure the years are well matched together, so the 2006 file
brings only spells active in 2006, the 2007 in 2007 etc. Append the next affiliation
25In practice this trimming will affect all observations that are active in later years, so if you are
using many waves together keep all retrospective information and drop the repeated cases later,
during the Biding all years together phase.
26It is recommended the 2005 wave as the absolute earliest to keep the sample representative of
the population in that year. However you can use the 2005 file but name an earlier year as your
starting point. However the further away from 2005, the worse the representativity of the sample.
143
file (with pension and personal information). Trim the spells over the end of the
year and add the next file. Continue until you are left with the last wave. Do not
censored this last year.
If you choose to keep retrospective information in each year, as you append each
year erase duplicated spells. Here having created a variable for each year will come
in handy, as it would help to identify identical spells but in different years (waves):
they must share the same start date and the same firmID value. For the rare cases
where firmID is not available (for example in unemployment spells) use the variable
Codigo de Cuenta de Cotizacion Principal (CCCP) (right after the fiscal identifier
variable) to identify duplicates spells.
At this point you should have one unique affiliation file with all waves joined
together and no duplicated spells except from those that last beyond a calendar year
- for example, a job that starts in May 2006 and ends in June 2009 should have 4
entries: one each for 2006,2007,2008 and 2009.
Depending on what you are interested in, it may be a good idea to create a
effective end date variable that matches the latest end date for each spell - in the
example above, set the effective end date as June 2009 in all entries. This way if
you want to get statistics on tenure, you can either consider tenure up to the current
year or total tenure in the sample. In the previous example, the first variable would
be 8 months (May-December 2006) and the second 3 years (May 2006- June 2009).
As a general rule it is better to create new variable than modify old ones, and this
is particularly true with dates.
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3. Extensions
3.1 Contract modification adjustment
In many cases contracts change across the years - this is the case of temporary
workers promoted to permanent contracts. The way these cases are recorded in the
MCVL is not easy to deal with. Ideally, for the purpose of job market flows we would
like to have separate entries for each kind of contract.
Look at the varaible Fecha de modificacion del tipo de contrato inicial o del
coeficiente de tiempo parcial inicial, towards the end of the affiliation file variables.
If this variable is filled with a date, then there was a change in contract. The next
variable, Tipo de contrato inicial, contains the original contract code of the job. Use
the guide in step 1 to interpret its value.
Create an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if (1) the current wave year equals
the year of the contract modification date AND (2) the type of contract is not the
same as the original type of contract (for example, if there is a change from temporary
to permanent (or vice-versa) or to part-time).27
Duplicate the spell in which the indicator variable is equal to 1. Change the type
of contract of the first copy to be the original type of contract. Change the end date
of this first copy to coincide with the modification date, and change the start date
of the second copy to the modification date. Depending on how you want to treat
tenure, you may want to extend this last change to the start date of all the other
entries in posterior years to the contract modification. Now you have two spells for
each job: one before the contract change and one after.
Repeat these steps with the variable Fecha de modificacion del tipo de contrato
segundo o del coeficiente de tiempo parcial segundo and Tipo de contrato segundo.
27In case you are interested on recalls or temporary contract renewals, you may wish to also
create a new entry even if the contract type doesn’t change.
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This is the second contract modification variable.
Be careful when recording the length of each spell before and after the contract
change. In some applications you may be interested in the whole period (for exam-
ple for tenure) but if you want to count temporary and permanent job experience
separately you may want to treat the two contracts differently.
3.2 Unemployment Expansions
Before proceeding, sort all spells by worker id, labour market state and date (in this
order). Number the spells in separate variables for each state - so for example, if
a worker was unemployed in two separate periods, create a variable called number
of unemployment spell (NoU) and set it equal to 1 for the first one and 2 for the
second. Or if a worker had 9 temporary jobs, create a variable NoT and number
them chronologically.
Sort again the sample by id and date of entry and exit. Fill in all the blanks
in NoU equal to the previous NoU value and set 0 for all spells before the first
unemployment value. Using this variable (NoU), create another variable counting
the days the worker is employed at each year in between unemployment spells. This
will give us the total number of days contributed to the social security, which we
will use to calculate unemployment benefit entitlements.28 Remember to reset this
counter to zero each time there is a new unemployment spell.29
Create a variable equal to the end of each spell (call it original ending) that will
be of use later to calculate the extension period.
28Self-employed workers do not contribute to the social security so do not count self-
employment spells.
29Some workers can choose to “save” part of their unconsumed unemployment benefits for next
unemployed period, in which case the time contributed by the next job won’t count towards the
total. By resetting after each unemployment spell by default we make sure we only count the
minimum possible time a worker could have contributed to the social security.
146
The LTU expansion
First, join consecutive unemployment spells within the year : if both unemployment
spells came from the same wave, and one starts immediately after the other, I con-
sider them one single spell30. There are many cases of workers that received more
than one subsidy at the same time (because of illness or family reasons) but they
are part of the same unemployment spell.
Second, if there is a gap between the end of an unemployment spell and the
beginning of the next job, extend the end date of the unemployment spell as to
join the two. Make sure that the next spell is employment or self-employment, and
not retirement. The reason for this is that we can’t be sure that these workers
are looking for a job - if they transition to retirement probably they were out of
the labour force to start with. I choose to extend the spells of workers whose last
entry is unemployment to the end of the sample31. This is crucial to account for
all the workers whose benefits have expired and are still unemployed at the end of
the sample. If your final year is beyond 2009, you should definitely do this as the
number of unemployed workers without benefits reaches 50% in 2012.
Third, if the previous extension meant that the unemployment spell extended
over the year of its original wave, duplicate the unemployment spell and set the
wave year equal to the next year. If as a result the spell extends over two years,
create two copies. For example, if a spell started and ended in 2009 but after the
expansion it ends in 2010, create a duplicate of the original spell and modify its year
so it belongs to 2010. This way there would be two copies: one in 2009 and one in
2010 - as it would be the case if unemployment benefits wouldn’t have expired.
30Some authors want to make distinctions between unemployment benefits and unemployment
subsidies - the latter referring to reduced amounts that some long term unemployed workers receive
after running out of unemployment insurance. If so you may want to skip this step.
31I restrict this expansions to the cases when the end date of unemployment benefits is within
the two years prior to the end of the sample.
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The STU expansion
In addition to the previous expansion, create a new unemployment spell if there is
a gap between two jobs that lasts more than 15 days32 and at least one of the
following conditions are met:
1. the first job was self-employment
2. the first job ended in a quit (if the variable Causa de Baja en Afiliacion is 51)
3. by the end of the first job, the worker hasn’t accumulated 12 months of con-
tinuous employment
In all of the previous conditions, the worker is not legally entitled to unemployment
benefits, and thus we can interpret the period between jobs as unregistered unem-
ployment.33 You can further restrict these conditions by imposing that the firm
identifiers of the two firms are different, so the worker is not being recalled to the
same firm.
Set the end and start dates to fill in the gap between jobs. If this expansion takes
the unemployment spell over the year of the wave, duplicate as in the previous case.
Finally, stata creates a new variable to identify copies and originals every time
you duplicate observations. If your software of choice does not do that, make sure
you have an indicator variable for these unemployment spells so you can identify
them later.
32This threshold is arbitrary. Results do not change much when the limit is put at 10 days or 1
month. Garcia-Perez (2008) also sets 15 days as a reasonable threshold.
33See section 1.3.3 in Chapter 1 for more information on this assumption.
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4. Panel Formatting
4.1 Select the window
The LFS runs interviews during the reference quarter, and so it gets its answers from
replies in an unknown reference day within the quarter. This is inevitably going to
lead to discrepancies in the results, as if the reference day in the MCVL doesn’t
coincide with the LFS the answers can be different. The extent of the discrepancy
would depend on the frequency of flows: if there are more transitions within the
month than within the quarter, then the probability of discrepancy is higher. The
approach here is to select a window period within the quarter (or the month if inter-
ested monthly transitions). I chose the 15th to the 30th of the first month of each
quarter. That is, the 15th-30th of January, April, July and October. Avoiding the
first of these months is important, especially in the case of January as many jobs
start after the Christmas break - which in Spain can last up until the 6th of January.
Several robustness checks can be done by changing the window, but the results don’t
substantially change - except in the Christmas season as noted.
4.2 Create quarterly state variables
Once the window has been chosen, I focus on the spells whose entry date is after
the beginning of the window period, but before the end. If there is more than one
such spell within a window, I chose to keep the one that continues onwards - that
is, the last one. Another approach is to take the one with longest duration, but
this can prove difficult. For example, take a long employment spell that ends the
22th of January, followed by 6 months of unemployment. The first spell would be
selected if we apply the longest duration rule, but the second spell would be selected
instead if we keep the continuing spell. This is particularly important if in the next
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window period the worker is employed again, as not counting unemployment can
understate the flows in and out of unemployment. Because of this I choose to follow
the continuing spell approach.
Once we have one spell per window, all that is left is to fill in a variable for a
spell-period. In many cases you will have to create copies of the same spell, when it
appears in two different windows. For example, an employment spell that features
in the first and second quarter would need to be duplicated. The original will be
assigned to quarter 1 and the copy to quarter 2.
If you have applied any of the unemployment expansions, you may also want to
create a different state for unregistered unemployment spells. For example, if an
unemployment spell that originally lasted for a quarter now lasts for two - because
of the LTU expansion - then you can label the first observation ”U” and the second
”0”. For this you must use the extension date variable we created before modifying
the start and end dates of spells. All unemployment spells generated from the gaps
expansion can also be labelled differently.
4.3 Create stocks and flows
The last step is to only keep spells that feature in a quarter and discard all other
spells. We will be left with a panel dataset that mimics the structure of the LFS, with
one observation per quarter. In this case however we will more detailed information
- precise tenure and experience data for example. This can be used to calculate
unemployment stocks (with or without benefits) and temporary share of employment,
for example.
To create flows, just link two consecutive quarters for the same worker. String
variables are best for this, as you can simply add two strings to form a new variable.
Here you may want to relabel “TUT” or “UTU” flows, conditioning on the duration
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of unemployment (or the temporary contract). This can also be achieved by following
“the longest spell” rule when choosing one observation per quarter. Note that this
brings the MCVL flows closer to the LFS, but they are not classification errors -
which is the reason these flows are modified when working with surveys (see Elsby
et al. (2015) for more details).
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A.2 STU additions
Table A.1 provides summary statistics for the unemployment spells broken by modifi-
cation. The first to notice is that most unemployment spells (37%) are not modified,
but the number of modified spells is also substantial (30% for the LTU expansion
and 32% for the STU). It is worth noting that not all of these spells appear in the
unemployment rates pictured in figures 1.4 and 1.7, only those that correspond to
the state of the worker in a given quarter. The statistics in table A.1 correspond
to all spells. The first thing to notice is that unemployed workers with a STU ex-
pansion spell are younger and have less experience in all type of employment and
unemployment. In particular, they have been unemployed an average of 0.7 years in
their working lives. The spells are also shorter than those of the LTU expansion (205
versus 430) but the original spells are even shorter. This is because of two reasons:
First, a requirement on STU spells is that they last longer than 15 days (which is not
required for registered unemployment spells). Second, many registered unemployed
workers with long spells run out of benefits, which means that long spells are in the
LTU expansion category. Figure A.1 illustrates this point by showing the histogram
of spell duration by extension.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics of Unemployment Spells
No Modification LTU Expansion STU Expansion
Observations 755,413 625,973 661,626
Percentage 0.370 0.306 0.324
Age 39.79 36.68 31.00
(10.79) (10.15) (10.12)
Female 0.462 0.445 0.449
(0.499) (0.497) (0.497)
Duration (days) 148 430 205
(322) (494) (286)
Experience PC 7.376 5.638 2.011
(8.502) (7.108) (3.928)
Experience TC 3.104 2.702 1.435
(2.633) (2.311) (1.653)
Experience Unemp 2.053 1.761 0.714
(2.227) (2.003) (1.349)
Sample is all unemployment spells in the 2004-2013 period. Averages with standard errors in
parenthesis. Experience is measured in years,duration of the spell in days.
Figure A.1: Histogram of Spell duration, by Extension
















Appendix B: Detailed results for the Decomposi-
tion of Unemployment Duration
Table B.1: Variance decomposition with raw data and LTU expansion
Spain Spain Austria
raw data LTU exp. raw data
Total 1.409 1.694 1.711
Constant 1.645 1.645 1.645
(1.168) (0.971) (0.961)
DD -0.527 -0.341 -0.187
(-0.374) (-0.201) (-0.109)
HT 0.290 0.390 0.253
(0.206) (0.230) (0.148)
Notes: Log duration in days, share of total variance in parenthesis. Ages 25 and over.
Results for Austria taken from ?
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Table B.2: Variance decomposition with LTU and STU expansion
Spain Spain Spain Austria
NE STU exp. STU + spell corr. Non Employment
Total 3.240 2.607 3.257 3.081
Constant 1.645 1.645 1.645 1.645
(0.508) (0.631) (0.505) (0.534)
DD 0.724 0.444 0.918 0.624
(0.223) (0.170) (0.282) (0.203)
HT 0.871 0.519 0.694 0.812
(0.269) (0.199) (0.213) (0.264)
Notes: Log duration in days, share of total variance in parenthesis. Ages 25 and over.
Results for Austria taken from ?
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Notes: Log duration in days, share of total variance in parenthesis. Ages 25-50.




Table C1 below shows the coefficients for the controls on table 3.3. In particular,
education, sex, dummy for foreign born, industry of precious employment, dummy
for quit, part-time in the previous job.
Table C2 shows the results of adding a quadratic term for number of tempo-
rary contracts in the main regressions of tables 3.3 - 3.6. Nothing really significant
changes, although the quadratic term is significant for regressions on duration of un-
employment (columns 1-2) and duration of next job (column 4). In all regressions,
the number of temporary contracts needed to turn the sign of the effect is over 100.
Table C3 presents the results of the regressions on unemployment duration (table
3.3 by industry of next job. The coefficient on number of temporary jobs (No. T)
is significant and negative in all regressions. The results are consistent to those in
table 3.3.
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Table C.1: Regressions on Duration - controls
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks) log(weeks)
quit -0.185∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.297∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗
(0.00394) (0.00398) (0.00401) (0.00466) (0.00566) (0.00568)
Construction (post 2008) 0.545∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.00926) (0.0112) (0.0116) (0.00818) (0.0105) (0.0109)
Construction (pre 2008) 0.226∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.0650∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.0104) (0.0115) (0.0118) (0.00909) (0.0116) (0.0119)
male 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ - - -
(0.00368) (0.00390) (0.00389) - - -
High School -0.0523∗∗∗ -0.0464∗∗∗ -0.0463∗∗∗ - - -
(0.00419) (0.00456) (0.00455) - - -
Baccalaureate -0.0782∗∗∗ -0.0691∗∗∗ -0.0694∗∗∗ - - -
(0.00558) (0.00542) (0.00541) - - -
College -0.0591∗∗∗ -0.0467∗∗∗ -0.0474∗∗∗ - - -
(0.00622) (0.00628) (0.00627) - - -
part-time 0.0394∗∗∗ -0.00223 -0.0125∗∗ -0.0534∗∗∗ -0.0773∗∗∗ -0.0816∗∗∗
(0.00432) (0.00407) (0.00405) (0.00478) (0.00558) (0.00559)
foreign born -0.0523∗∗∗ -0.0576∗∗∗ -0.0560∗∗∗ - - -
(0.00545) (0.00594) (0.00594) - - -
Extractive Ind. 0.455∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.0316) (0.0334) (0.0337) (0.0463) (0.0510) (0.0516)
Manufactures (primary) 0.444∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0111) (0.0135) (0.0138)
Manufactures (machinery) 0.453∗∗∗ 0.755∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.0105) (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0105) (0.0127) (0.0130)
Manufactures (detail and repair) 0.459∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0174) (0.0197) (0.0199)
Energy, gas, residual treatment 0.482∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0220) (0.0223)
Retail and repairs 0.486∗∗∗ 0.772∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
(0.00983) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.00790) (0.0101) (0.0105)
Transport and storage 0.408∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0128) (0.0130) (0.0116) (0.0141) (0.0145)
Hospitality 0.429∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(0.00896) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.00872) (0.0113) (0.0116)
Communication and IT 0.455∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0140) (0.0159) (0.0163)
Financial 0.423∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0188) (0.0191) (0.0225) (0.0251) (0.0253)
Real State 0.489∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.0250) (0.0287) (0.0291)
Professional services 0.465∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0105) (0.0126) (0.0129)
Auxiliary services (cleaning, gardening, rental) 0.398∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗
(0.00935) (0.0109) (0.0112) (0.00779) (0.00979) (0.0101)
Public Administration 0.565∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0105) (0.0124) (0.0127)
Education 0.509∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0125) (0.0146) (0.0149)
Health and Social Services 0.412∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.477∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.0113) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0144) (0.0147)
Other Services 0.461∗∗∗ 0.724∗∗∗ 0.752∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0100) (0.0122) (0.0125)
Observations 587222 465832 461369 587222 465832 461369
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.559 0.561 0.462 0.457 0.458
AIC 1502925.7 1189482.3 1176423.7 1082258.0 840389.4 829077.3
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment, for workers aged 20-55. Excludes
recalls (workers returning to the same firm), self-employed and spells shorter than 15 days.
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Table C.2: Quadratic term for temporary contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(weeks) log(weeks) log(next wage) Duration of next
(OLS) (FE) (OLS) employment spell (years)
No. T -0.040∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0005)
No. T2 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
YEmp 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0021)
3 months claim 0.222∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0063)
6 months claim 0.224∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0075) (0.0047) (0.0086)
12 months claim 0.171∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0126) (0.0060) (0.0152)
18 months claim 0.135∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.0102) (0.0195) (0.0078) (0.0247)
24 months claim 0.040∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0270) (0.0096) (0.0343)
Last P 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0073)
Tenure 0.015∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.000 0.043∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0039)
Experience -0.007∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0006)
log(past wage) -0.080∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017)
age -0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗





Constant 1.214∗∗∗ 0.648 7.132∗∗∗ -0.279
(0.2354) (0.4052) (0.2263) (0.3046)
Controls
Years X X X X
Industry X X X X
Occupation X X X X
Region X X X X
Observations 465832 465832 465832 357914
Adjusted R 0.560 0.458 0.146 0.134
AIC 1188835 840068.483 1284936.423 1067594.896
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample is all finished unemployment spells ending in employment,
for workers aged 20-55. Excludes recalls (workers returning to the same firm), self-employed and spells
shorter than 15 days.
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0.003
0.008
∗∗∗
0.001
0.006
0.020
∗∗∗
0.006
(0.0045)
(0.0124)
(0.0029)
(0.0026)
(0.0052)
(0.0063)
(0.0015)
(0.0017)
(0.0030)
(0.0027)
(0.0046)
(0.0075)
(0.0068)
(0.0035)
(0.0018)
(0.0024)
(0.0046)
(0.0032)
(0.0033)
3
m
onths
claim
0.183
∗∗∗
0.121
0.187
∗∗∗
0.220
∗∗∗
0.271
∗∗∗
0.239
∗∗∗
0.185
∗∗∗
0.188
∗∗∗
0.228
∗∗∗
0.211
∗∗∗
0.225
∗∗∗
0.254
∗∗∗
0.174
∗∗
0.268
∗∗∗
0.264
∗∗∗
0.132
∗∗∗
0.194
∗∗∗
0.238
∗∗∗
0.245
∗∗∗
(0.0276)
(0.1059)
(0.0233)
(0.0217)
(0.0438)
(0.0508)
(0.0101)
(0.0104)
(0.0226)
(0.0117)
(0.0266)
(0.0501)
(0.0545)
(0.0200)
(0.0098)
(0.0171)
(0.0213)
(0.0189)
(0.0193)
6
m
onths
claim
0.206
∗∗∗
0.160
0.205
∗∗∗
0.220
∗∗∗
0.214
∗∗∗
0.234
∗∗∗
0.198
∗∗∗
0.213
∗∗∗
0.192
∗∗∗
0.221
∗∗∗
0.252
∗∗∗
0.214
∗∗∗
0.155
∗
0.264
∗∗∗
0.261
∗∗∗
0.188
∗∗∗
0.195
∗∗∗
0.235
∗∗∗
0.256
∗∗∗
(0.0315)
(0.1428)
(0.0262)
(0.0246)
(0.0480)
(0.0532)
(0.0120)
(0.0118)
(0.0254)
(0.0150)
(0.0302)
(0.0603)
(0.0616)
(0.0227)
(0.0121)
(0.0192)
(0.0243)
(0.0221)
(0.0233)
12
m
onths
claim
0.191
∗∗∗
0.275
0.175
∗∗∗
0.205
∗∗∗
0.217
∗∗∗
0.181
∗
0.136
∗∗∗
0.196
∗∗∗
0.200
∗∗∗
0.179
∗∗∗
0.247
∗∗∗
0.266
∗∗
0.092
0.247
∗∗∗
0.193
∗∗∗
0.184
∗∗∗
0.130
∗∗∗
0.163
∗∗∗
0.202
∗∗∗
(0.0489)
(0.1675)
(0.0385)
(0.0336)
(0.0652)
(0.0761)
(0.0184)
(0.0169)
(0.0355)
(0.0235)
(0.0451)
(0.0824)
(0.0851)
(0.0336)
(0.0185)
(0.0276)
(0.0387)
(0.0327)
(0.0366)
18
m
onths
claim
0.181
∗∗
0.112
0.189
∗∗∗
0.178
∗∗∗
0.410
∗∗∗
0.116
0.146
∗∗∗
0.177
∗∗∗
0.200
∗∗∗
0.065
0.188
∗∗
0.150
0.161
0.156
∗∗∗
0.163
∗∗∗
0.172
∗∗∗
0.037
0.015
0.138
∗∗
(0.0597)
(0.2093)
(0.0491)
(0.0441)
(0.0832)
(0.1129)
(0.0264)
(0.0233)
(0.0475)
(0.0374)
(0.0606)
(0.1124)
(0.1147)
(0.0472)
(0.0255)
(0.0408)
(0.0535)
(0.0493)
(0.0501)
24
m
onths
claim
0.226
∗∗
0.121
0.100
0.143
∗∗
0.218
∗
0.188
0.090
∗∗
0.121
∗∗∗
0.148
∗
-0.071
0.161
∗
-0.082
-0.078
0.075
-0.002
0.045
-0.061
-0.101
0.069
(0.0850)
(0.2866)
(0.0644)
(0.0538)
(0.1007)
(0.1131)
(0.0340)
(0.0294)
(0.0614)
(0.0477)
(0.0804)
(0.1627)
(0.1458)
(0.0613)
(0.0339)
(0.0507)
(0.0790)
(0.0637)
(0.0696)
Last
P
-0.027
0.179
0.029
0.066
∗∗
0.029
0.019
0.015
0.042
∗∗∗
0.069
∗∗
0.034
∗∗
0.051
∗
0.009
-0.032
0.046
∗
0.017
-0.019
0.068
∗∗
0.058
∗∗
0.020
(0.0292)
(0.1234)
(0.0229)
(0.0227)
(0.0443)
(0.0470)
(0.0124)
(0.0101)
(0.0212)
(0.0116)
(0.0257)
(0.0501)
(0.0505)
(0.0189)
(0.0104)
(0.0183)
(0.0208)
(0.0197)
(0.0196)
Tenure
0.021
∗∗
-0.006
0.008
-0.004
0.004
0.009
0.015
∗∗∗
0.004
0.018
∗∗
0.032
∗∗∗
0.006
0.025
0.004
0.010
0.029
∗∗∗
0.017
∗∗∗
0.020
∗∗
0.027
∗∗∗
0.015
∗
(0.0077)
(0.0292)
(0.0052)
(0.0045)
(0.0082)
(0.0109)
(0.0032)
(0.0026)
(0.0054)
(0.0047)
(0.0079)
(0.0129)
(0.0118)
(0.0058)
(0.0031)
(0.0043)
(0.0068)
(0.0056)
(0.0064)
N
o.
P
-0.050
∗∗∗
-0.003
-0.051
∗∗∗
-0.011
-0.024
-0.027
∗∗∗
-0.021
∗∗∗
-0.060
∗∗∗
-0.040
∗∗∗
-0.035
∗∗∗
-0.021
∗
-0.010
-0.004
-0.040
∗∗∗
-0.023
∗∗∗
-0.059
∗∗∗
-0.023
∗∗∗
-0.015
∗
-0.046
∗∗∗
(0.0067)
(0.0546)
(0.0051)
(0.0089)
(0.0198)
(0.0043)
(0.0055)
(0.0043)
(0.0060)
(0.0026)
(0.0093)
(0.0178)
(0.0216)
(0.0084)
(0.0036)
(0.0063)
(0.0069)
(0.0059)
(0.0059)
Experience
-0.008
∗∗∗
-0.007
-0.002
-0.010
∗∗∗
-0.007
∗
-0.005
-0.011
∗∗∗
-0.008
∗∗∗
-0.010
∗∗∗
-0.009
∗∗∗
-0.004
0.002
0.003
-0.000
-0.008
∗∗∗
-0.004
∗∗
-0.009
∗∗∗
-0.011
∗∗∗
-0.003
(0.0018)
(0.0113)
(0.0018)
(0.0018)
(0.0034)
(0.0033)
(0.0008)
(0.0010)
(0.0018)
(0.0011)
(0.0029)
(0.0062)
(0.0043)
(0.0021)
(0.0009)
(0.0013)
(0.0021)
(0.0015)
(0.0018)
log(past
wage)
-0.041
∗∗∗
-0.066
-0.077
∗∗∗
-0.086
∗∗∗
-0.075
∗∗∗
-0.072
∗∗∗
-0.064
∗∗∗
-0.068
∗∗∗
-0.075
∗∗∗
-0.083
∗∗∗
-0.082
∗∗∗
-0.139
∗∗∗
-0.042
∗
-0.091
∗∗∗
-0.081
∗∗∗
-0.064
∗∗∗
-0.085
∗∗∗
-0.128
∗∗∗
-0.095
∗∗∗
(0.0067)
(0.0488)
(0.0070)
(0.0072)
(0.0148)
(0.0150)
(0.0036)
(0.0032)
(0.0076)
(0.0036)
(0.0071)
(0.0130)
(0.0173)
(0.0053)
(0.0027)
(0.0049)
(0.0056)
(0.0054)
(0.0051)
age
0.004
0.044
0.002
-0.002
0.009
-0.024
-0.001
0.007
∗
-0.013
-0.010
∗∗
-0.026
∗∗
0.015
-0.005
-0.008
-0.003
-0.004
0.020
∗∗
0.009
-0.010
(0.0071)
(0.0399)
(0.0068)
(0.0066)
(0.0123)
(0.0135)
(0.0031)
(0.0033)
(0.0071)
(0.0037)
(0.0094)
(0.0190)
(0.0167)
(0.0066)
(0.0030)
(0.0050)
(0.0071)
(0.0055)
(0.0059)
C
onstant
1.478
∗∗∗
0.474
1.643
∗∗∗
1.570
∗∗∗
1.853
∗∗∗
1.920
∗∗∗
1.500
∗∗∗
1.592
∗∗∗
1.314
∗∗∗
1.047
∗∗∗
1.509
∗∗∗
1.899
∗∗∗
1.095
∗
1.960
∗∗∗
1.220
∗∗∗
1.969
∗∗∗
1.478
∗∗∗
0.606
∗∗∗
1.247
∗∗∗
(0.1941)
(0.9736)
(0.1662)
(0.1614)
(0.3374)
(0.3276)
(0.0900)
(0.0884)
(0.1972)
(0.1176)
(0.2464)
(0.4034)
(0.4665)
(0.1503)
(0.0800)
(0.1276)
(0.1531)
(0.1335)
(0.3743)
C
ontrols
year
dum
m
ies
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
industry
dum
m
ies
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
occupation
dum
m
ies
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
O
bservations
11034
596
15055
16359
4323
3489
67225
64521
16371
51602
11434
3115
2222
19950
87080
23193
16399
29802
22049
A
djusted
R
2
0.575
0.484
0.544
0.510
0.542
0.586
0.509
0.547
0.574
0.592
0.570
0.566
0.596
0.564
0.565
0.617
0.576
0.660
0.595
A
IC
25959
1548
37858
41103
10791.130
8806
162699
154858
43103
129922
28624
7806
5312
49479
224697
55336
39398
82515
55867
R
obust
standard
errors
in
parentheses.
Sam
ple
is
allfinished
unem
ploym
ent
spells
ending
in
em
ploym
ent,for
w
orkers
aged
20-55.
Excludes
recalls
(w
orkers
returning
to
the
sam
e
firm
),self-em
ployed
and
spells
shorter
than
15
days.
160
